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FOREWORD
This report prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirement of
Technical Development Plan (TOP) P43-03 (POIA), considers decision making
at the top management levels of the Naval Education' and Training Command.
Traditionally top management decision making relies heavily on informal
techniques--intuitive judgments by experienced managers, traditions and
"rules of thumb" peculiar to each organization, or informal consensus
among a group of managers. Currently, however, the training command must
do a job which is unprecedented in its complexity and must do it despite
declining resources. These considerations indicate the desirability of
increased effectiveness in'decision making. This report surveys the
potential role of and desirability of more formal approaches to some top
management decision problems.
Appreciation is expressed to the staffs of the organizations studied
for their cooperation. Special thanks are due to Mr. E. Riley (Chief of
Naval Education and Training Staff) and Mr. Z. McNaney of the Training
Analysis and Evaluation Group who coordinated the field research effort.
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In 1966 the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the Advanced Devel-
opment Objective (ADO) 43-03X, "Education and Training Development." This
document recognized both the importance of the education and training
methods and management techniques in making training more effective.
Subsequently, Technical Development Plan (TDP) P43,-03X was prepared in
response to the ADO. Part 01A of the TDP, "Design of Training Systems,"
addressed the management of the training effort, with the goaT of providing
training manager-s at all levels with an effective decision making capabil-
ity. Implementation of this subproject is the respongibility of the Train-
ing Analysis and Evaluation Group (TAEG), Orlando, Florida.
The TAEG has contracted with the Federal Systems Division of Interna-
tional Business Machines (IBM) to conduct a study in support of this work.
IBM has, among other things, conducted a broad survey of management func-
tions within the Naval Education and Training System, and proposed a number
of areas in which computerized decision aids would be useful to training
managers. Initially, three computer models were designed and developed, all
of which address problems of managing student flows, course and resource
planning, and system requirements. A fuller discussion of this background
can be found in a series of reports prepared by TAEG, particularly TAEG
Reports No. 11-1 (Lindahl, et al., 1973), 11-2 (Lindahl ano Gardner, 1974),
12-1 (Volumes I and II), and 12-2 (Volumes I, II and III).
B. PURPOSE
The purposes of this report are:
(1) to provide training managers basic but pertinent reference
material on the subject of'decision analysis, (2) to stimulate interest
in decision analysis for the purpose of adopting the concepts in problem
solving, and (3) to present a consultant's observation and-recommendation
for improving decision making within the Naval Education and Training
Command (NAVEDTRACOM).
C. REPORT ORGANIZATION
In section II the process of decision making in large organizations
is discussed. Included are some notes on the decision making mechanisms
observed in large organizations, a taxonomy of decision making, an intro-
duction to the field of decision theory, and a summary of the use of
decision theory in organizations. In section III the background and
responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET)
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organization are presented preparatory to a discussion of the decision
making process observed in CNET, Chief of Naval Education and Training Support
(CNETS), and Chief of Naval Technical Training (CNTECHTRA). Finally,
section IV consists of .a summary and recommendations for improvement in
the NAVEDTRACOM decision making process.
O
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SECTION ICI
DECISION MAKING IN'LARGE ORGANIZATIONS
-One'of the purposes of this .report is to suggest improvements to the
.decision'making process within the NAVEDTRACOM. It is worth noting that
formal techniques, whether they go under the guise of computerized manage-
ment information systems, operations research, decision theory, etc., have-
a disappointing track record in general management, althou44 there have
been some outstanding successes. Part of the reason for this may lie i -n
the way decisions tend to get made in organizations, whether the methods
used be formal or informal.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL SETTING AND DECISION MAKING
In traditional economic theory, busingss firms act in such a way as
to maximize profits, given that there are'behavioral goRstraints imposed
by the competition, the marketplace, government, and society. The picture
of decision making in this theory is 'nat of managers a9d or-Ortzati-ona
forces together working to pull together information, assess uncertainty,
and make rational choices to maximize profit under uncertainty. One would
predict, under these assumptions, a number of behavioral patterns which
do not seem'to exist in real organizations; further, the traditional theory
does not provide for a good many important behavioral patterns observable in
actual firms. Traditional theory doesn't allow.), for example, for complex
organizations, problems of control, standard prdctices and operating pro.-
cedures, budgets, 'politics,. entrenched "bosses" or aspiring 'middle
managers."' In short, the traditional theory of the firm does not address
the mechanism by which managerial decisions are made. It isprecisely
this mechanism, however, which is the focus of this research. Thus, it is
vital to have a good understanding of organizational decision making. This
would not only give a basis for analyzing NAVEDTRACOM, bEialso provide a
realistic background for evaluating suggested improvements. A standard
reference in the descriptive theory of organizational decision making is
Cyert and March (1963). This work has "an explicit emphasis on the actual
process of organizational decision making as its basic research commitment."
The remainder of this section draws heavily upon the framework and observa-
tions made in this book. Although the Cyert and March research was done
specifically on large, multiproduct, profit-making firms in oligopolistic
markets, the major observations on organizational decision mechanisms seem
to be valid, for any large organization, including public sector not -for-
profit organizations.
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS
Any organization is a coalition of individuals, each with his own set
of goals. These individuals are, in turn, organized into groups, the groups
into larger groups, and so on, with each level adding anew set of goals.
7
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How then does one manage to set goals for the enti,re organization withoyt
causing fatal conflict? :There are two answers to this question: first''
the goals themselves are structured in Such a way as to avoid conflict;
,
and second, the goal setting mechanism.allows for ,conflict resolUtion.
Goals are rarely structured in precise, unambiguous terms. On the
contrary, studies of organizational objectives suggest that agreement on
objectives usually exists only when objectives'are highly ambiguous, and'
that behind this agreement lies considerable uncertainty and disagreement
On subgoals. To a large extent critical areas of conflict are never-
brought into theopen, and agreeing, in es'sence, to disagree is usually a"
semipermanent way of life. Goals which are set usually take the form of
aspiration levels, which are subject to change over time, rather than
imperatives to "maximize" or "minimize." This ' tends to make conflict
resolution less urgent, as organizational units are. judged by the degree
to which they attain the aspiration levels, which are largely setaccord-
ing.to oast experience, rather than by what is theoretically possible.,
The goal-setting mechanism is also an important stabilizing influence.
Organizationdl goals are 6ot, as a rule, set through a process of analytic
determination of optimal procedures, but thhugh a bargaintng process.
The parties to the goal-setting reach *Tements through sharing rewards,
not only such monetary rewards as budgets, salaries, and contracts, but
nonmonetary rewards. as well: promotions, citations, policies, personal
treatments, private commitments, etc. This process allows parties to
settle conflicts through relatively non-disruptive mechanisms. The ob-
jectives resulting from this process have a number of important attributes
(Cyert and March, 1963, p. 32):
1. They are imperfectly ratiOnalized. The exact forms of the agree-
ments will depend at least-ath much on the bargaining skills of the ledders,
the history of the bargaining session, and the particular resource scar-
cities faced as on the merits of the issues themselves,
N. 2. Some objectives are stated in the for of aspiration-level com-
mitments, such as "We must allocate ten percent of our total budget to
research." The determination of the "ten,percent" undoubtedly has little
to do with cost/benefit analyses of the particular research
'projects avail-
able, but a good deal'to do with the prestige, power, and persuasiveness
of the research director.
3. Some,Objectives are stated in.a nonoperational form. Such ob-
jectives have the advantage of being consistent with virtually any set of
operational objectives, for example, nonoperational goals are evidenced
in such political rhetoric as "We must 'crack down: on crimes while simul-
taneously protecting citizens rights and eliminating police brutality,"
This can be cited in favor of such diverse operational goals as increasing
the use of wiretapping and eliminating the use of wiretapping.
8
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Once organizational objectives have been established, a number of
stabilizing mechanisms tend to make them permanent. Budgets are based
partly on past budgets. Allocations of functions and other precedents
are remembered and followed, sometimes taking the form of "rules of thumb"
or "the usual way we do things," and occasionally becoming part of the
standard operating procedure. Thus accidents of organizational geneology
tend to ecome perpetuated, to be abandoned only under pressure. FIrther,
organiza i ns tend to build up a certain amount of "fat' (termed "organiza-
tional,s ck" by Cyert and March, 1963). In case of adversity, this pro-
vides a cushion so that business as usual can continue, perhaps indefini-
tely or at least until a. new bargaining cycle can be completed.
It is worth contrasting the preceding description of organizational
goal setting with an objective, or "rational" procedure, which would re-
quire the firm to predict,the environment, survey all possible actions,
then pick a set of goals which would result in the best actions. It is
not at all clear that the objective procedure; even if it were possible
to implement-it; would be the better way to chose goals. Clearly the
actual process contains valuable mechanisms .16. keeping the organization
stable and viable, and substituting the "rational" procedure could easily
result in the surfacing of chaotic conflict.
ORGANIZATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Expectations are seen as the result of drawing inferences from.availr-
able information. Thus, while goal setting might be. seen as both a way
of stating what.considerations are important,in an organization and of
setting up evaluation standards; expectations might be thought of as pro-
jections of what will happen. ,,One can study expectations,' then., both from
the standpoint of how inferences are drawn and of how information is made
available in the organization.
'On the subject of inference drawing, two general observations.can:be:
made. First*, expectations are biased, both consciously, and unconsciously,
by hopes, wishes,_ goals, and internal bargaining. The manipulation is
usually subtle,' but is occasionally overt. A classic case of the latter
occurred in a major Naval weapons system acquisition procurement project,
which suffered 'a budget cut severely limiting the number of units to be
purchased for the fleet. The cut was justified by a study showing that the
new lower number of weapons (less than half the-number originally planned)
was adequate to meet the needs of the fleet; however,,the study was in
response to, rather than in anticipation of, the budget cut. Second, it
apiars that the..computational power and precision available to organiza-
tions. are limited: One obServes that only on a few Of the potentially
relevant variables are data gathered and projections made. AlSo, the pro-
jectiOns that are made tend to be very simplistic, requiring a minimum of
calculation. There is, of course, nothing wrong with simplicity, but by
and large the capacity for more sophisticatediflethods seems to be lacking,
even when such methods may be .justified-.
9
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Information availability within an organization is strongly affected
by the nature of the data gathering system. Information becomes available
in d fragmented; sporadic- fashion at different organizational and geo-
graphic.locations. Communication of the information is subject to severe
bias, delay, and filtering effects; internal communication is, in fact,
a significant competitive weapon within the organization. Thus the com-
munication system introduces significant distortion into the system; over
the long run, however, systematic bias seems to be at least partially de-
tected and accounted for.
Most significant decisions require information which is not readily
available, thus implying the need fora search procedure. In rational
economic theory, a firm would have a portfolio of potential investments,
against which new proposals would be continually evaluated. Information
search should, in theory; be treated'just like any other proposal, as a
potential investment of resources whiCh is expected to yield a benefit.
An information Search project, if accepted, would be analogous to a
prospecting-expedition the world is searched in a systematic way with
particular data needs in mind, and any nuggets of information found are
brought back and assayed. In reality, this ideal picture is inaccurate
on a number of counts. First, project evaluation and information search
do not occur continually, but only as a result of fairly obvious problemS.
Organizations do not plan nearly .as much as they fight fires, reacting to
current crises. Seculd, search activity is not itself treated as an
investment. Rather, there are various levels of search activity that are
called intn play, so that for a given situation there is a standard search
procedure. Further, the criterion of search activity is feasibility rather
than optimality.- As soon as something is found that seems to (more or less)
solve the problem, the search-stops; the only questions asked are "Is it
feasi6le?" and "Is it-better than what we have now?," rather than "Is this
the best possible way of handling the problem?" Finally, the search pro-
cedUre is not nearly so-Much a prospecting expedition as a "mating dance.",
The direction of the search is largely'determined by the conspicuousness
of the alternatives, and as various people, both inside and outside the
organization, have their own interests tied up in the decision they natu-.
rally try to make their preferred alternatives the most conspicuous ones.
Thus, the organization is not only in search of information, but interest
groups are trying to make at leasparts of the-information known to the
organization.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE
There are. three basic principles in decision making: (1) avoid con-
.stderation of uncertainty, (2) maintain organizational rules and precedents,
and (3) keep decisiOn rules simple.
It seems paradoxical to speak of firms avoiding the consideration of
uncertainty. After all, the world is uncertain. There are procedures,
1P4
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however, which minimize the need to predict uncertain events. First, firms
do very little meaningful long range planning: Moving instead from one
crisis to the next. Second, firms rely heavily upon standard rules for
doing things, whether these be traditional methods, general industry prac-
tice, or standard operating procedures. These not only influence (and in
many cases dictate) the decisions which are made, but provide stability and
predictability to the organization. Thus,. when Department A is working on
a problem, it is'already known -Wh-atths-res-p-drrse-s-of Departrapnts B and C
to their parts of the same problem are going to be. In addition, planning
records made within the organization act to fix commitments and expectations.
"Plans, like other standard operating procedures, reduce a complex world to
a somewhat simpler one. Within rather large limits-, the organization sub-
stitutes the plan for the world--partly by making the world conform to the
plan, partly by pretending it does" (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 111). When
possible, organizations arrange a negotiated envronment.
The Stabi1iing influence of .standard procedures would largely be lost
if the procedures were to change frequently. The procedures build up around
themselves a myriad of precedents,. understandings, and unspoken connotations,
thus.becoming entrenched. When procedures are changed there is always a
period of uncertainty.and unsettlement until things "get worked out" again.
The second principle of decision making, then, is to maintain the organiza-
tional procedures and precedents.
The third and final principle is to keep decision rules simple. Gen-
erally one searches for feasible alternatives (rather than optimal ones)
and implements the first one encountered. Thus the search procedures
strongly affect the decision making process. There are, of course, prob-
lems which come up which are not adequately covered by standard procedures.
Rather than-elaborate procedures to cover a wider variety of problems,
organizations'opt to keep the rule simple and rely on individual judgment
to provide flexibility.
SUMMARY
It is important tu_recognize the potential of analytic techniques.
First, on problems that are reasonably complex, particularly when uncer-
tainty is involved, formal 'techniques can, if used properly, nearly always
result in better decisions. Second, effective use of formal techniques does
not require replacement of the entire corporate decision making apparatus.
An individual manager can make effective use of such techniques on problems
falling within his own area, or in broader problems, to yield results for
his Own evaluation of alternatives, or as ammunition in corporate give and
take. The techniques themselves are useful for broad or harrow problems,
or for top or lower level deciSions; however, due to the fact that at some
levels, for some problems, explicit rationality would be a positive
binderance rather than a help, one should pick. the problems to be analyzed
rather carefully.
-11
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B. DECISION MAKING - A TAXONOMY
There are'any number of ways of classifying decisions--by subject area
(inventory decisions, personnel decisions, etc.), by managerial level (top
leVel decisions, middle level decisions. lower level decisions), by im-
portance (critical, major, minor, etc.), and so on. A taxonomy should,
though, be an aid to good decision Oking, not simply an arbitrary classi,.
float on-scheme. I-deal-1-y-La-clecisio6-mater could -use-a-taxonomy not -only
to attach 'a classification. label to'a given decision problem, but to find
an approach useful in solving his problem. Thus, the starting point in-
constructing a decision taxonomy is to considerthe decision making process
itself.
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Dec on making involves foUr steps: forecasting or projecting,
identifying -alternatives, determining measures of effectiveness of possible
outcomes, then making the choice. The first step, forecasting or projecting
the needs of the organization, the outside environment, future constraints
upon the organization, and so forth, defines the context against which any
decision must be evaluated. In some decisions this step is critical; deter-
mination of capacity needs in training facilities depends on forecasts of
training volume and methodology, for example. There are other cases where
this step is less important, as in choosing among methods to present a
standard block of training. In forecasting, it seems useful to distinguish
two extreme situations. The first extreme, called in this paper a "well
defined" situation, is one where the objectives, the constraints, the
structure, and the. relationships among'variables in the, problem are
relatively well understood. A good example of this is an inventory policy
decision. Demand is well understood and, though uncertain, amenable to
analysis. Costs of carrying a given inventory level can be defined and
calculated. Costs of a stQckout, though harder to calculate, can still be
understood and approximated. Relationships among supply, demand, stock
level, lead times, etc., can be easily specified. Contrast this with the
other extreme, an "ill defined" situation, such as a decision problem like
"what shouldCNET's policy toward enlisted personnel training be over the
next five years?" Here a good, deal of effort must be expended simply. ln
defining the critical queStions, the alternatives, and relevant considera-
tions before the problem can be meaningfully discussed. Initially, at
least, the ill defined problem would seem to call for a different type of
approach than the welldefined probleM.
Another characteristic of decision problems which can be observed
during the forecasting phase is the importance of uncertainty. Occasionally
the uncertainty in a problem is relatively minor, so one can act as if all
relevant factors were known. Many resource allocation problems and sched-
uling problems, for example, are of this type. Most real problems,
however, involve uncertainty to a major degree, .and decisions made under
1612
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the assumption of certainty may be grossly misleading. Thus, one must
adopt different techniques for dealing with these two types of problems.
The second step in decision making involves 'Specifying alternatives.
In well defined problems these are usually readily apparent; in the inven-
tory policy decision, alternatives are defined by all possible stock
levels and reordering policies, and the choice of the inventory_ control
me-c-hants-rn itself. In defined problems a major effort may be needed
to define a set of reasonable alternatives.' If uncertainty is a considera-
tiOn, then it may be necessary to specify contingent, as well as immediate
alternatives. Thus, techniques for dealing with decision problems under
uncertainty must include methods of identifying and describing contingent
decision structures.
In the third step in the decision process, measures of effectiveness
are specified. This involves considering the job to be done and identify-
ing considerations relevant in evaluating alternatives. Sometimes a single'
measure can be identified as an overriding consideration, but more often
one must deal with multiple criteria, some of which may not be measurable.
Suppose, for example, that the job is to train pilots. Some relevant con-
siderations are the length and cost of training, final pilot proficiency,
capacity of the training pipeline, and a number of others. Only some of
these considerations are directly measurable, so it is necessary to specify
ways of estimating nonmeasurable outcomes. An approximate measure of
pilot proficiency, for example, can be constructed by use of subjective
evaluations, such as instructor comments, and results of quan:Itative
tests, such as proficiency exams. Finally, these various measures are
combined into a single measure of effectiveness. As a rule this last step
is not performed explicitly; it is unusual to find a manager who has speci-
fied in any coherent manner the kinds of trade offs he is willing to
make among effectveness,measures. Usually decisions are made on a case-
by-case basis by consensus or "common sense"; these intuitive decisions do,
however, define implicit trade off structures.
--The final step in decision making iso select the best alternative
among those specified. A variety of techniques, ranging from snap judg-
ments to sophisticated and expensive computetized models are available
to aid in this step. A major purpose of this taxonomy is to wed the
decision problem with the appropriate technique.
THE TAXONOMY
The taxonomy developed in this research is outlined in figure 1.
Branches on the breakdown tree in the figure are numbered, so that the
discussion can be keyed to the appropriate part of the breakdown struc-
ture. A breakdown, between problems not requiring thought (branch [1])
and those requiring thought (branch [2]), is introduced at the top of the






TAEG Report- No. 27
(2) REQUIRES
THOUGHT

















SIMULATION ADD ".OBJECTIVE" PROBABILITY UTILITY








FIGURE 1, A DECISION 'TAXONOMY
1416
HEURISTIC
TAEG Report No. 27
reminder; that, many problems are too trivial, too obvious, or tbo con-
strained; to justify detailed analysis. It is important to remember that
the scope and expense of the analysis and the magnitude of the original
problem must be kept in.proportion. Most- of the solution methods dis-
cussed below can be applied in either relatively simple or relatively
complex manners, depending on the demands of the problem.
WELL. DEFINED, CERTAIN, UNIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS (BRANCHES [3] and [4]).
discussing the taxonomy, consider first a problem which (1) requires
thought, (2) is well /defined, (3) can be treated as certain, and (4) has
a single measure of effectiveness. Most real problems aren't this uncom-
rlicated, but this simplest case is important as an approximatjon for
many real problems and as an introduction to the more complex Situations.
Nearly all solution techniques for more complex problems consist of ways
to reduce them to this simplest case, then using the techniqOes for this
case to solve the problem. An enormous variety of techniques suited for
such problems is known; here they are classified broadly as simulation
techniques (branch [3]) and optimization techniques (branch [4]).* Some
of these solution techniques require computers for useful implementation.
Simulation techniques are projection techniques. Given a particular
decision, the simulation method predicts the outcome. In order to deter-
mine the best decision, one must redo the simulation many times, trying all
possible decisions in order to find the best one. Informal , "seat-of-the-
pants",:dudgments are classified as simulation techniques in this report, as
judgments consist of projecting the consequences of an act:on, then choosing
among the actions. Simulation techniques can be extremely straightforward.
Every manager who has projected a cash flow, forecasted expenses, or set up a
budget has,; in effect, performed a simulation. The idea in simulation is to
formulate ,a set of rules which govern the behavior of a, system, then apply
those rules to see how the system acts. The more complex the simulation be-
comes, the more expensive, time consuming, and error prone it becomes, but the
more potential usefulness it has. There have been many cases where complex
simulations yield insights impossible to obtain in any other way.
ry
Optimization techniques differ from simulation techniques in that
optimization techniques are designed to not only predict outputs, but to
determine automatically the best possible decision. The price one pays for
this additional feature is usually a good deal of additional complexity.
There are a number of "standard" types of problems (such as linear pro-
gramming models) which can be relatively easily solved. If -a particular
problem fits one of these types, then optimizing may be straightforward,
although perhaps expensive.
A complete discussion of optimization is well beyond the scope of this
. report. An introduction to this field can be found in Wagner (1969). A
good, elementary, managerial-oriented discussion of optimization and simu-
-lat,i_on,with examples of how each can be applied, is contained in Springer,
Herlihy and -6e0s (1965).
15
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WELL DEFINED, CERTAIN, MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS (BRANCH [5]). There are
two approaches to this situation. First, one might try to express all the
measures- in terms of some common measure; such as dollars. Suppose, for
example, one must decide whether or not to install an expensive computer
system to individually
manage student instruction, and that tests have
shown a decrease in the average length of 'training time under the comput-
erized system. There are multiple measures in this decision, dollar cost
and average training time. These could, however, be reduced to single
measure, dollars, if one could express the worth, in dollars, of having
a student complete training earlier. There are a-number of other techniques,
some fairly simplistic and some quite elegant, for reducing multiple criteria
to a single criterion. These will be discussed somewhat further in section C,
under "Determining Preferences for Outcome".. Once a single criterion is es7
tablished, then either simulation or optimization techniques can be used to
solve the problem.
Second, in some problems it is easier to work directly with multiple
criteria than to try to reduce them to a single criterion. If the problem
is solved,by a simulation technique, this is no particular problem; outcomes
projected by the simulation technique are characterized by many measures of
effectiveness rather than one, and in the end the decision maker must choose
among them. Thus, although he may be able to avoid an explicit specification
-of -the trade offs he is willing to make among objectives, he cannot avoid
striking some kind of balance among them in the final analysis. If one
wishes to use an optimization technique to solve the problem then working
with multiple criteria-becomes very difficult. It is possible tolnake some
use of optimization; for eXaMple,
_one might do a number of optimization cal-
culations, each time using a different measure of effectiveness as the
optimized. criterion. Witri some luck, this wouid-n-arrow-the choices down
enough to effectively solve the problem. In the more general-case, though,
it is difficult to make good°use of optimization.
WELL DEFINED, UNCERTAIN, UNIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS (BRANCH [6]). This hasbeen an extremely important special case, particularly in the financial_
literature, and has given rise to a number of ideas, all of which are de-
signed to translate this problem to an equivalent problem Sunder certainty,
so that the usual simulation and optimization
solution techniques can be
used. Before discussing these approaches, a bit of terminology must be
introduced. In an uncertain problem one Aoes not, by definition, know in
advance the exact value of the outcome for any decision. One always knows,
though, that for a given decision some results are more likely than others.
It is possible to express this knowledge by describing, or assessing, a
probability distribution for the outcome. Given the probability distri-
bution one can calculate a number of data, the most important of which are
the mean or expected value (a measure of the average value of the outcome)
and the standard deviation (a measure of,the spread, or variability, in
the outcome). It is also possible to calculate, the chances of any given
value of the output being exceeded.
4
16
TAEG Report No. 27
The first approach to solving these problems ignores uncertainty as
long as it stays within predefined limits. In setting up the problem, the
decision maker can specify such constraints as his maximum allowable loss,
on the probability that costs, for example, exceed a given figure. Within
these bounds he uses some simple measure of outcome, usually the expected
value, to solve his problem. In this way he translates the uncertain
problem into a constrained problem under certainty, which is readily
solved by certain optimization techniques.
A second approach does not utilize the probability distribution as such,
but embodies such ideas as "Let's assume that the,worst (or best) possible
event will occur, then maximize our gain under that assumption." It has
been pointed out that this approach can lead to overly pessimistic (or
optimistic) decisions, so a variation has been developed which allows the
.decision maker to express his personal attitudes toward risk by picking a
value fora "pessimism factor," which is then used to balance the best and
worst cases. Still another variation assumes that all uncertain events, are
equally likely, then maximizes the expected value of the criterion.
The third approach consists of defining a new, certain measure of effec-.
tiveness, most commonly by subtracting a constant times the standard devia-
tion from the expected value of the outcome.. The rationale is that, varia-
tions being equal, one would choose the alternative with the higher expected
value. If variations are not equal, then one must have a higher.expetted
value to offset the additional risk of the larger variation. One is allowed
to set the degree of offsetting required by picking the value of the
constant referred to above.
All these approaches-;are useful in certain circumstances, but can be
shown to lead to irrational detisions in other cases. A more general ap-
proach, known as utility theory, can be shown to be valid for all problems,
given that one believes some basic assumptions about the meaning of the
term "rationality." In the utility approach, the decision maker expresses
his attitudes toward risk in the form of a curve, called a utility curve.
The utility curve is then used along with the 'probability distribution
mentioned above to calculate a measure of "goodness"which accounts auto
matically for ,the uncertainty in the results. This utility measure can
then be uSedith any of the techniques discussed under branch [3] to solve
the problerM: .This approach, although unfamiliar to many managers,js
straightforward.
WELL DEFINED, UNCERTAIN, MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS (BRANCH [7]). Sometimes
,the iteria can all be expressed in terms of a common measure; as was
discus d for problems with multiple criteria with no uncertainty (Branch
[5]). To ake the same example, it might be possible to approximate the
'worth, in do lar$, of shortening training by one day, then express the un-
certainty both 'n the cost of the computer system and in the number Of days
by which training ould be shortened in terms of a single, uncertain, total
17
TAEG Report No. 27
dollar figure. The problem could now be solved by methods discussed under
branch [6].
In many problems it is impossible to express the criteria in terms of
a single criterion. Another approach exploits the ideas of utility theory,
discu4ed briefly above. In the case where a single criterion exists in an
uncertain problem, one expresses his attitudes toward risk in the form of a
utility curve. In this case, where multiple criteria exist, one can, in
theory, do the same thing,.except that the utility curve becomes a 3-
dimensional or higher dimensional curve, a utility hyperplane. Because of
practical difficulties, it is possible to determine what this hyperplane
looks like only for certain special cases. Fortunately most real problems
can be treated as one of the special cases, so the multidimensional utility
approach can be an extremely useful analytical tool. Even if a problemHis
one which doesn't fit the "special case" category, one can usually get a
good approximate solution by treating it as if it were, then seeing how
sensitive the results are to the utility assumptions.
.A third approach to this class of problems consists of using heuristic
approximation techniques, or in more everyday language, using reasonable
ideas that seem more-or-less to work. One might, for example, select what
he considers the most important outcome measure, get A rough idea of the
probability distribution of that outcome, then make a tentative decision
based on that; he would then check the other outcome measures to make sure
that his solution wasn't ridiculous before making the decision final..
Another commonly used approach has been to set "aspiration levels" on all
the criteria, then'to search for a decision alternative which has a reason-
able chance of attaining all the aspiration levels. In choosing training
methods, for example, one may set limits on the cost and the length,of.
training, the physical facilities needed, and the prerequisites on the
student input, then choose the method which seems to have the best chance
of meeting the limits. The major problem with such 'heuristic methods is
that they depend heavily on the,ingenuity and judgment of the human
deCision maker, and humans can be shown to be notoriously poor processors
of uncertain, multidimensional information. Both the methods mentioned
above, plus many others one could conceive of, can lead to bad decisions at
times. Somewhat mbre structured approaches can usefully supplement, though
not supplant, the capacities of human judgment.
ILL DEFINED PROBLEMS (BRANCH [8]). Solving an ill defined problem requires
first shaping it into a well defined problem; doing this requires a dif-
ierent type of effort than discussed so 'far. Any-real situation is infi-
nitely complex in detail, so the first step in analysis is to identify the
major issues and constraints in a problem. Next, the major action alter-
natives should be outlined, and some thought given to the impact of each
possible action upon the major issuet. Third, the most promising alter-
natives are selected for further study, then th.k process is repeated.
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Thus, the process of analysis is cyclical rather than linear. With each
cycle the problem and the issues become successively better defined until
the problem can finally be effectively defined and solved. In the early
stages of problem definition formal approaches are of limited use, as the
problem ls mainly one of encoding impressions, knowledge, and attitudes.
Even at this stage, however, systematic methods of thinking can pay divi-
dends. A systematic approach to decision making, both in ill defined and
well defined situations, is outlined in the next section.'
ROLE OF COMPUTER-BASED METHODS
Computers have the capacity of processing enormous amounts of data at
staggering speeds with excellent accuracy. In addition, it is ROssible to
build a good deal of sophistication into computer programs. This can,
under the proper circumstances, allow a manager to supplement his own ex-
pertise with the intelligence which went into designing the computer pro-
gram. For these and other reasons piles of computer printouts, and occa-
sionally computer time sharing terminals, are becoming increasingly common
sights in managers' offices. The precise role played by the computer in
the Jedision making process can, hoWever, vary a good deal. One critical
dimension to the computer's role, namely the relative involvement of the
computer versus the manager in making decisions can be depicted.as shown
in figure 2.
At one extreme, the computer can be used simply as' a data gathering
and summarizing tool. The manager retains not only all decision making
prerogatives, but the bulk of the analytical workload. The computer may do
a minimal amount of computing (summarizing, calculating ratios, computing
variances, etc.), but the primary use of the computer in this mode is to
feed data to managers for their analysis and interpretation, and to handle'
routine paperwork. The bulk of current applications is of this type.
Managerial and cost accounting systems, payroll systems, and many produc7
tion control systems, to name a few examples,' can be classified in this
category.,
The prevalence of. su ch data gathering and file maintenance systems
has led to the creation of'sizeable and reasonably complete data bases.
These data bases are, in most cases, potentially valuable for a variety of.
managerial purposes. Data gathered and stored as Rart of a payroll system,
for example, is frequently useful in the analysis of productivity and the
projection of employee expenses. Data from a billing and invoicing system
can be used in inventory. control. The Navy maintains extensive records
on equipment maintenance and failure histories as part of the 3-M system;
these data are potentially useful to the training command in indicating
problem areas and possible training deficiencies. The usefulness ofa
given data base for a new purpose is limited, however, by the organization
and scope of the data.. Usefulness of-3-M data to the training command, for
example, is limited by the fact that the training record of the man respon-
sible for given equipment is not recorded.











FIGURE 2. INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMPUTER VS THE MANAGER IN DECISION MAKING
20
aTAEG Report No. 27
A more complex category of applications involves using the computer
to analyze data through simulation models. As explained earlier, simula-
tion techniques involve representing a system in a mathematical form.
Consider, for example, a simulation model to predict student tOdighput
in a training program. There are a:number of factors which clearly affect..
throughput, such as the nature of the training to be performed and the
skill level desired, instructor availability and skill, the amount and
type of training equipment available, student intelligence and motivation,
and so on. The builder of the simulation model attempts to determine which
of these factors are most important in determining throughput, and just
how the critical factors interrelate to determine the throughput. He thep
puts these relationships into a mathematical fOrm which can be used in 6-
computerized model. Once this is done, the manager can use the simulation
model in a number of ways--to forecast some figure of interest, such as
the budget required to.produce,a given student throughput, to perform
"what If" analyses, to plan and design a new system or a change to the
present.system, or in many other ways. A feature shared by'all simulation
models is that the human, the manager, remains in the decision loop. The
computer simply projects the effects of a set of assumptions, and it is up
to the manager to examine the results and either change the assumptions
and perform additional analysis, or to make a final decision.
Thenext level of coMput,:x application involves the use of computerized
optimization techniques. Optimization techniques, being designed to auto-
matically determine the best possible decisions in a given situation, have
the capability of removing the manager from direct involvement in the
decision process. Usually, however, the manager is involved in interpreting
and implementing the analytical results. MoSt optimization techniques are
designed to yield information not only about the optimal decision,, but
information on the sensitivity of the result to various data and assumptiops
used in the model. The purpose of this is to allow the manager to estimate
the impact of factors not included in the model, and to explore the feasi-
bility of alternatives other than those derived by the optimization technique.
Thus, the manager and the computer usually supplement one another in the
decision process.
Finally, there are some cases when it has been shown useful to erimi-
nate the manager from the decision process altogether: In many inventory
systems, a computer not only sets reorder points and quantities, but places
the order as well. The only impact the manager has on this process is to
occasionally review the system performance and to adjust the rules by-which
the computer makes its decisions. Production scheduling and process control
are other areas where this "closed loop" approach,has been applied. All
these applications occur in situations which are 'repetitive, and where the
major variables in the decision process are known.
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C. OUTLINE OF FORMAL DECISION ANALYSIS
The decision aids outlined l n the previous sec
. , a 4ough eful,,
do not provide a general method of attacking Pill stmanagerial
.- ion
problems, 'In these. other areas, nearly decisions are made intuitively,
and there are some circumstances
..- some better method than intuition
is desired. Perhaps-the decisi is of major importance., or the com-
plexities and uncertainties of the problem are such that there is a need
to integrate the expertise an knowledge of a number Of people in the
organization; o perhaps there is a need to explain the rssues,and trade
offs in the .pro lem to someone else, either a superior or an ally. In any
event, there ar circumstances en a rational, systematic method of
utlining the decision process is '!II' d. The bag of techniques.for doing
t v is o collectively as ."decision ..alysis" or sometimes "decision,
theory." Very briefly, use of these techni..-s one tof
1. Outline all alternatives and to consider all possible consequences
of each alternative inma systematic way,.
2. Break ajarge, co plex problem down into a series of smaller,
. simpler problems so-that di erent experts' or organizational units can
contribute to the solution of the problem in their particular areas,
3% Specify And quantify uncertainty, and determine how critical the
uncertain variables are,
46
4. Specify, in a logical manner, the trade offS one is willing to
make among outcomes,
,
5. Determine the worth of gathering further information, and finally
a measure of how much better that decision is than any other alternative.
This last point is useful in deciding, for example, whether factors ignored
in the formal part of the analysls could possibly change the
- decision.
Basically there are four steps to decision analysis: (1) structuring
the problem, (2)Aetermining uncertainty, (3)'determining preferences for
outcomes, and (4) obtaining results.
STRUCTURING THE PROBLEM
3
Consider, for the purpose of illustration, a highly simplified decision
problem. Suppose you are trying to decide whether to invest $1000 of your
money in a bank, where you are assured a 6 percent annual return, or in a
business venture. If the business is successful, you would receive a 100
percent return over the next year, while if it went broke you would lose
everything. You will cash in your investment at the end of one year in
any case. To keep the problem simple, assume these are the'only two
possibilities, and that there are no other uses of your money that you wish
22
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to consider. Finally, suppose it is possible to buy some information con-
cerning your problem. A business expert of your acquaintance has heard of
two other business ventures of the'type you are interested in; for a $100
.fee he Would research the problem for you to find out if the two were
successful. This problem can be. diagrammed in the form of a decision tree,
as shown in figure 3. Note that the decision tree lays out, in chrono-
logical order, all possible decisions and uncertain events;ty convention,
the decision points are represented by squares and the uncertain events
by circles. If you invest in the bank, then the decision, tree showS a. sure
-re -turn of $1060 (the original $1000 plus the 6 percent interest) at the
end Of,the year Similarly if you invest in-the buSiness you will have
either $2000 or nothing atthe end of the year. If you purchase the informa-
tion, then you will find out that none, one, or two of the other ventures
were successful.', This is treated as an uncertain event since you d6-not
knoW in advance which of .these is the true case. After receiving this
information,-you can decide on the bank or the business investment, with
the possibilities of gain pr loss,as shown. Note that the $100 cost of
tie, information has been taken into account in calculating the payoffs.
Even'..,,for this siMple'problem, the decision tree is an extremely useful
device for organizing one's thinking,- for decomposing a large problem into
a series of smaller ones, ,and fo gathering information. A decision tree
,
also serv,:ss as a good comm4nica ion tool in outlining a problem to some-
one else. Decision trees have he advantage of_being easy to draw and
manipulate, making them useful even when high-powered analysis is not
;.warranted.
DETERMINING UNCERTAINTY a
A critical. factor in the investment problem outlined above is the
probability.of the bUsiness being successful. One rarely knows in advance,
of course, what the odds are, but usually there is at least a vague ,
impression of some kind-,(the business "looks promising" r-perhaps "seems
risky"). It is possible to quantify these impressions by interviewing the
decision maker, or better yet, an expert in the field, to determine a
probability distribution of the odds. The probability distribution can
then be used to determine the'attractivehess of the business venture. The
probability data can also be'combined with objective data, such as is
obtained on the ".purchase information" option, to determine whether th
venture still looks good after the information comes in, and. to determy
whether or not the information is worth the $100 cost.
DETERMINING PREFERENCES FOR OUTCOMES'
In our example .a single. measure of effectiveness, namely the.amount
of money at the end *of the first year, is used. Even in this case, it is
not clear.how to proceed; for one thing, people's attitudes towards risks
differ. Itaay well be optimal, for example, for a 'poor .man to pass up an
otherwise attractive investment because the'chances of loss are too great.,
A
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Even when two individuals have the same wealth, one person may be more
willing to take chances than the other. A method for dealing with these
considerations was first suggested by von Neumann and Morganstern (1944).
Their idea was to pick a "best" outcome and a "worst" outcome"which are
at least as good and bad, respectively, as any outcome you expect to get.
In the investment example, the best and worst possible outcomes are $2000
and -$100. Then for each possible Intermediate outcome, one must assess
a probability such that the intermediate outcome is'exactly as attractive
as a gamble between the best and worst outcomes. This probability is
called the "utility" of the outcome. For example, consider the $1060
which we would receive by investing in the bank.. We assess the utility
of $1060 by determining a probability, which we will call so that the
gamble in figure 4 is neither more nor less attractive than $1060 for sure.
If p were nearly one then the gamble would be more attractive, while if p
were nearly zero the $1060 would be more attractive, indicating that there
must be some value of p between zero and one where the choices are equally
attractive. Note th t the valve of p chosen would vary from individual to
individual, depending n the detision maker's personal attitudes toward
risk.
Finally, von Neumann nd Morganstern (1944) point out that the value
of p (or the utility) is a easure of the relative attractiveness of the
$1060 consequence, and prove that the expected value of the utilities of
endpoints is a valid decisio criterion under uncertainty. To solve the
investment problem, then it is necessary only to assess the utility for
each end point, calculate the expected utility for each decision, which,is
easily done, then choose the action with the highest utility.
The validity of the utility approach depends upon certain behavioral
"axioms, or observations on rational behavior. The major ones are:
1. Given two consequences A and B, then either A is preferred to B,
B is preferred to A, or both A and B are equally attractive;
2. If A is preferred to, (indifferent to) B and B is preferred to
(indifferent to) consequence C, then A is preferred to (indifferent to) C;
3. Given a utility assessment problem such as is outlined in figure 4,
it is always possible to find a value p such that the gamble and the "for
s:Ire" amount are equally attractive;
4. If consequence A is vreferred to consequence B then of two dif-
ferent gambles between A and B, the one.offering the larger chance at A
is preferred.
These seem to be reasonable assumptions, but it has been observed that
people do not always act according to the axioms. This fact indicates that
utility theory may not be a good descriptive theory, but emphasizes its
25
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WHICH GIVES A PAYOFF OF $2000
WITH PROBABILITY p AND A PAYOFF
or 4100 WITH PROBABILITY (1-p)
YOU MUST SET THE VALUE OF p SO THAT G AND ® ARE EQUALLY ATTRACTIVE.
FIGURE 4. UTILITY ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
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potential -usefulness as a prescriptive theory; i.e., one which indicates
improved decision methods.
In the.case where multiple measures of effectiveness must be used,
the same basic ideas of utility theory hold. Due to.practical problems,
however, it is possible to assess a multidimensional utility function only
if certain assumptions. about one's 'preferences hold. For most problems
the assumptions are. valid, making it possible to use the utility approach.
OBTAINING RESULTS
Once the problem has been structured and the probabilities and pref-
erences assessed, obtaining results is a straightforward computational
matter. Simple problems can be,solved by hand, while for more complex
analyses a number of computer methods can be used. The hardest part, by
far, in a decision analysis is in structuring the problem and gathering
data, rather. than in calculating the solution. A good deal of "art" is
required in selecting the portions of a problem to explicitly repre'Sent,
since a decision tree can rapidly become overly complex if too much detail
is included. Analysis is generally a cyclical, rather than a linear
process. This comment applies particularly to this type of analysis. The
first cut at'a problem should outline major alternatives and outcomes only
roughly. After "lopping-off" the least promising branches of the initial
tree, the remaining part can be elaborated, and this process continued as
long as is necessary.
D. USE OF FORMAL DECISION THEORY IR ORGANIZATIONS
In section II.A some questions were raised.concerning the role of
formal analySis in real organizations, indicating that it is important to
identify the types of problems for which formal techniques would be v,seful.
One way of approaching this.issue is to summarize successful applications
of the method.
APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
Decisibn analysis, in its present form, resulted from a marriage
between a particular school of thought concerning statistical analysis
(the so-called "Rayesian" approach) and the von Neumann-Morganstern theory
of utilities. Von Neumann and Morganstern were interested primarily
_:in applications in economics, giving that side of the union a strongly
business oriented bent, and as the union was consummated largely in
graduate schools of business, most of the applications work has been in a
business setting, Reinforcing this propensity has been the fact that
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BUSINESS APPLICATIONS. An important early application of decision theory
is Markowitz (1959). Markowitz Oas concerned with the rational invest-
ment of funds in a portfolio of potential investments, each characterized
by an expected monetary return and a de4Yee of riskiness. The portfolio
problem is how to determine the investment, or mix of investments, which
optimizes the_return/risk trade off.
.
The portfolio selection process has a direct analogue in business
decisions involving capital investment. Matheson (1969) discusses an
analysis.of new product development alternatives. Briefly, a major manu-
facturing research company has developed two compounds for.a particular
market, and the decision must be made to do final development On neither,
both, or only one of them, and if the latter, to decide which one
Cook (1968) presents another analysis of a product development, this
iime,'in the atomic power field. ..Four different product development
alternatives for atomic electric generating stations were analyzed. A
complex computer model of the market, costs, demands, and sales aspects-of
the problem was constructed and evaluated by decision analytic techniques.
Additional analyses of a similar nature are described by Laessig &
Silverman (1974) and-by Frederick (1973) who describes a product pricing
problem for butadiene, a petrochemical product, in which multiple criteria
were considered. Huber(1974) reviewed a number of field studies, primarily
business oriented, in which multidimensional.utility models were used. A
more complete and general discUssion of risk analysis in capital projects
is contained in Spetzler (1968). Spetzler interviewed a number of execu-
tives of a company, then used the resultant utility assessments to formu-
late a .corporate risk policy.
Decision analysis has also been shown to be useful in settings other
than investment problems.. Keeney (1969) discusses an application of multi-
dimensional utility theory to determine the optimal organization of a
telephone network. The object was to maximize the degree of service, as
determined by the percentage of time the lines are available to two dif-
ferent customer groups.
In Brown (1970) the results of a survey among firmS using, or who have
used, decision analysis are reported. The firms surveyed included organiza-
tions with several years of active,experience in decision analysis, some
where the method is fairly new but is in active use, some where there is
interest, but little application, one or two where decision analysis has
been a disappointment, and two consulting' firms with expertise in the area.
Brown found that general decision making procedures are not radically
affected by the presence of decision analysis, but that individual decisions
are often profoundly affected to the good. The consensus among the survey-
participants was that the methods had enormous potential which is not yet
realized. Major problems seen in using the method are: (1) management
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education, (2) communications between the analysts and the managers for
whom the analysis is done, (3) the difficulty in many organizations in
identifying who is responsible for specific decisions, and (4) organiza-
tional obstacles. Brown concludes that "If there is one dominant feature
that distinguishes the successful from the less successful applications of
DTA (Decision Theory Analysis), judging from the findings of this survey,
it is the organizational arrangements.
. . . The most successful appears
to be the 'vest pocket' 'approach, where the analyst works intimately with
the executive and typical.ly.reports to him...."
MEDICAL APPLICATIONS. A rich literature has grown up describing applications
of decision theory to medical problems. Among the reasons for this are:
medical decisions have important consequences in cost, suffering, and
death; medical problems are complex and involve uncertainty; the volume
and fragmentation of knowledge requires an effective integrating structure;
data are widely available and relatively easily obtainable; and public
interest in medicine is high. Although medical decisions per se are not of
interest in this research, the methodology of applying decision analysis
which is demonstrated in this field is. In particular, medical decisions
typically require consideration of multiple objective criteria, and a
number of techniques for dealing with this problem are described in this
literature..
A number of articles describe the application of decision theory to
specific medical diagnostic or treatment problems. Giauque and Peebles
(1974) discuss analysis of the treatment of strep throat and. rheumatic
fever, developing in the process a scheme for evaluating consequencet
with as many as 10 attributes. Ginsberg (1971) performs a similar analysis
for the pleural-effusion syndrome (which involves fluid in the lung cavity),
while Ginsberg and Offensend (1968) discuss a.diagnostic problem in spinal
bone disease. The approach to the multidimensional consequence evaluation
in both these cases was somewhat simpler. Thomas et al (1973) analyze the
diagnosis of heart disease, while Schwartz et al 0777 discuss hypertension
(high blood pressure). Some of the papers [particularly Giauque and. Peebles
(1974), Ginsberg (1971), and Schwartz et al (1973)] contain general dis-
cussions of decision analysis in addition to the specific studies.
More general approaches to broad problems. are contained in Giauque:
(not yet published) and Lusted (1971). Giauque discusses a utility approaCh
to measuring the quality of health care, with a particular application in
the treatment of hypertension. Lusted discusses the use of decision theory
in interpreting X-rays. Lusted (1968) contains an extensive bibliography
of other medical analyses.
PUBLIC SECTOR APPLICATIONS. Public sector applications are particul'a'rly
difficult to analyze since they have neither the natural measurement,
criterion.of profit found in business applications nor the data availability
of medical applications. Decision analysis offers methods both for dealing
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with the multiple criteria required in public sector_analysis and the
uncertainties,caused by lack of data, leading.to a significant volume of
literature on public sector applications:
* Howard, Matheson, and North.(1972) discuss the problem of deciding
whether or not to seed hurricanes with silver iodide. Experiments with
seeding have shown promising results, but a decision to seed a hurricane
bearing down on populated areas carri9s legal and moral consequences.
Howard et al used decision analysis to examine the problem and to explore
other decision alternatives besides* the "seed" and "don't seed" alterna--
tives. In Giauque (not yet published
- II) a scheme to determine an optimal.
method of oil spill cleanup in harbors, depending on the geographic and
climatic.conditions at the harbor, is presented. Keeney (1969) explores
blood bank inventory control and cost/benefit relationships of depth sur-
veying in the Cape Cbd Ship Canal through use of a multidimensional utility
analysis.
A second group of papers are broader in scope, but still deal with
well defined problems and priorities. Gear (1974) and Roche (1972) present
analyses of planning in education. Gear, after discussing approaches to a
number of common educational decision problems, presents an analysis of
secondary school pupil allocations between adjacent geographical areas.
Roche discusses an extensive'investigation.into the problem of resource
allocation among different subject areas in a secondary school. This
involved determining the trade offs the school'board'and school administra-
tion are willing to make among proficiency levels in the various subjects.
Other application areas include space and military planning. Matheson
(1969) presents a method for planning payloads on unmanned Martian explora-
tion vehicles. Power (1973) discusses an interactive system, utilizing
decision analytic concepts, to plan cost and schedule estimates for,anti-
ballistic missile programs.
Stanford Research Institute (1968) conducted a study for the Mexican
Government, in which a strategy for electrical power system expansion for
the entire country over the next 30 years was derived. This involved fore-
casting a complex array of power needs, technical advancements, price move-
ments of various fuels, and so forth, over this time frame: In addition,.
a number of social trade offs had to be considered. For example, the imp
pact on employment, self-sufficiency, side benefits, and technical exper-
tise required arevery different for say, nuclear versus hydroelectric
aenerating plants; This study is referred to and discussed in Matheson
(1969) and Howard (1971).
In a separate study, Keeney and Nair (1974) discuss the complex issues
and trade offs involved in licensing nuclear power plants within the United
States, and propose a decision analytic based approach to solving these
issues. Hammond (1971) and Ellis & Keeney (1972) derive methods to analyze ,
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problems of strategic military planning and air pollution control, respec-
tively. Finally, deNeufville and Keeney (1972) consider the possibilities
for future development of the Mexico City, Mexico, airport. A number of
effectiveness measures were used, specifically, noise problems, cost, capa-
city, safety, transportation time, and the number of people displaced by
the airport expansion.
.APPLICABILITY OF DECISION. ANALYSIS
The overriding impression one gets from reading the applications litera-
ture is the importance of the relationship between the analyst and the
decision maker.` What is studied does no.t seem to be nearly as critical as
how the study is performed. In the words of Keeney and Raiffa .(1972),
771Te metadecision of whether or not to do formal analysis cannot bedivorced
from the questions of Organizational structure, of the personal incentives
for the people involved, and of the quality of the analysts." Brown (1970)
also emphasizes the quality of the analyst-client relationship, The above
amounts to saying "Get a good analyst and a motivated manager, get them
working well together, and no matter what the problem is you'll get a
good analysis." This is the same thing that operations researchers have been
saying for years, and it seems to be true in decision analysis as well.
Some additional light on this issue can be obtained by referencing
figure 1. Branches of the taxonomy tree'marked with an asterisk are those
where decision analysis is most likely to be useful. If problems are well
defined, certain, and have a single decision criterion (measure of effec-
tiveness), the particular strengths of decision analysis are not really
called into ploy. In other types of problems, though, the usefulness of the
method can be dramatic, either alone or in.conjunction with Other techniques,
The structural aspects, of decision analysis are helpful i,n defining problevs,
specifying the magnitude of uncertainty, providing for contingent decisions,
and determining the sensitivity of results to assessments and assumptions.
The utility formulation allows one to, specify objective criteria valid under
risk, and to reduce multiple criteria to a single criterion.
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SECTION III
DECISION MAKING IN THE NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAJNING COMMAND
In the previous section a numberof general observations concerning
decision making in large organizations were summarized. With this back- '
ground, decision making in the NAVEDTRACOM is now discussed. Source mate-
rial for this section was gathered both during field interviews with NAVED-,
TRACOM staff personnel and from written material. A particularly useful
discussion of.the functions performed by the NAVEDTRACOM, including speci-
fically the decision-making functions, is found in TAEG Report 12-1. .
A. HISTORICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE NAVEDTRACOM
The NAVEDTRACOM was organized in August 1971.. Prior to that time the
training function in the Navy was allocated among a number. f agencies. Due
ft--
to the difficultie3 of coordinating efforts it was decided to consoli a e .
the responsibility for all naval training,,under the newly formed offi e of
the CNET. The CNET apt! his staff, located in Pensacola, Florida, ha. re-
sponsibility for .all naval education and training programs, except medical
training and some training done in the,Fleet (source: TAEG Report 12-1,
p. III-7).. Included in his duties are the responsibilities for organizing,
staffing, and running the training function, submitting and administering
training budgets, determining optimal training methods given the budgeting
and congressional constraints faced by the Navy; advising the remainder of
the naval organizations on training matters, and other related duties. The
position of CNET is currently filled by a Vice Admiral.
An organization chart for the major divisions of the NAVEDTRACOM is
given in figure 5. Five major entities report to the CNET. The CNETS is
tasked with providing to CNET and other assigned claimants support in the
areas of, first, material evaluation, development, production, support, and
.validation; and, second,.educational and library services, general military
training, and international logistics. The CNTECHTRA is assigned the re-
sponsibility of administering, staffing, supervising, and running the Navy's
technical training schools. The Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) per-.
forms the same functions for. chools involved with air training. The final
two organizational entities rep rting to CNET are the Commanders of Training
in the Atlantic and Pacific Flee (COMTRALANT and COMTRAPAC). These
organizations are tasked to work with CNET and their respective fleet com-
manders to implement and supervise fleet training.
Currently over 50 percent of all training dollars are spent on recruit
and advanced enlisted training, falling under CNTECHTRA, COMTRALANT, and













B. MAJOR DECISION MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVEDTRACOM
The responsibilities of the NAVEDTRACOM can be classified into 10
major areas. These are:
1. develop training requirements,
---2. analyze and plan training,.











New training needs arise from two types of situations. First, as the
hardware and systems used by the Navy change there is a need to modify the
corresponding training packages for incoming personnel and, in most cases,
to retrain current operating personnel. ,Second, the,requirements for ongoing
training are modified due to changes in such things, as personnel requirements,
characteristics, input rates, etc.; changes in operational demands; or changes
in policy. In general, a training need is defined as a need for a particular
number ofp6rsonnel with a given skill. The need requirement first goes to
BUPERS, where an inventory of Naval personnel with given skills is maintained,
to determine whether the requirement can be, satisfied out of the existing skill
inventory. If the requisite number of qualified people is lacking, then the
CNET is requested (or required) to provide training to meet the need.
As can be -seen, training requirements originate outside the NAVEDTRACOM,
as it is up to the operating Navy to determine needs an&the responsibility
of the training system to fill those needs. Training needs can come to
NAVEDTRACOM via four major interfaces:
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1. the Chief of Naval Operations,
)2. the Naval Material Command,
3. the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and/or
4. the Fleet Commands.
These interfaces
-ar not clearly defined, however, in that requirements
given to CNET are usually ambiguous (TAEG Report 12-1, op. cit.). In addi-tion certain types of changes, particularly policy, changes, may affect the
requirement for training greatly, but the changed requirements may neverbe formally submitted to CNET in the form of a training task requirement;in such cases CNET generates, the requirements internally. An example ofsuch a policy change is the decision to implement the all volunteer force.For these reasons, and since the determination of requirements is criticalto the effective functioning of CNET, this function is handled as if it
were an integral part of the training syStem.
DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING SYSTEM
1
. The problems of developing training re-quirements can be seen to be both important and ill defined. The first
step in solving an i'l defined problem is to make it into a well defined'problem. In the CNET organization this is accomplished as follows. Eachyear CNET is faced with d "base load" of continuing training requirements;
resourca levels needed to support such training are routinely estimatedand factored into the budget. New requirements,, on the other hand, gothrough the justification process outlined in figure 6." This procedurebegins with the submission of new training requests, which are then analyzed
and prioritized by CNET, A request for new training generally, but notalways, is originated outside CNET. The first.step in processing the re-quest s to make an,estima'te of the resources required to implement therequest. The form used to,documeht the estimates (CNET Form 1500/8, seefigure 7) requires estimates of funding requirements and known sources,classroom and laboratory space requirements, 'instructor requirements, and/
other pertinent data.
It is currently the case; and it is reasonable to expect that it will
continue to be the case, that resources for training are less than desired.
resources. This necessitates a continual ordering of desired'activitiesinto a priority sequence. Currently,"prioritization involves two phases,a fairly mechdnical.scheme
which assigns a numerical
"priority designator"to each project, and project review by either one or two committees, depend-ing on the particular project.
'1Refer to TAEG Report 12-1, Vol 1 (op. cit.'. Prioritization is discussedunder the "Coordination
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C.
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS REQUEST
NEW. EXPANDED TRAINING PROGRAMS
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Figure 7. CNET Form 1500/8
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Clearly, the priority of any particular program should be determined.
by a number of factors, including usefulness to the fleet, urgency of the
training, length and cost of the training, projected cost savings (if any)
anticipated, etc., plus any number of such intangible but critical issues
as who the program sponsor is, and the "political" effects of the training
both inside and outside the Navy. The prioritization scheme currently used
addresses some of the issues in ,a formal manner and others in an informal ,
manner op not at all. The formal phase consists of the use ofhe scheme
outlind in figure ,8 to assign a "priority designator." This procedure is
used for all projects except those relating to air training; it is expected
that the air training command will develop a similar scheme 'appropriate for
their needs. A complete description of the prioritization scheme is con-
tained in CNET Instruction 1500.10 (11 June 1974).
The factors considered in the formal scheme and how they affect the
riority designator are summarized below:
A
1. The military purpose of the trainjn Possible categories, in
general.order of priority, are special, strategic, sea control, projection
forces, logistic-support,'and general and non-warfare. Special projects
are those which, due to their Impact.on the. Navy or their urgency as de-
fined by higher authority, must-receive special consideration. These pro-
jdcts always have the highest pri6rity. Although strategic programs gen-
erally have the highest priorities, and logistic support and general non-
warfare training the'lowest priorities, there are some exceptions to this
rule.
are:




life support, including damage control and safety
surveillance (search and detection), electronic warfare, security
and intelligence, operational security, and cover and deception
command and control, weapons control, and tactical data processing
weapons (offense or defense), missile and gun systems, and specific
primary functions of non-combatants, and
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Higher priorities are associated with combat related categories (propulsion
and auxiliaries, communications, etc.) and the lowest priority with admin-
istration, planning, and personnel.
3. Urgency of the training. The-highest priority is assigned to
tasks required to maintain operational effectiveness in the fleet or to
implement CNO-directed programs. Other categories, in decreasing order
of pribrity, are:
major training objectives to which this course contributes sig-
nificantly cannot be met by alternate means
, most major training objectives to which this course contributes
significantly can be met by alternate means, but some major ob-
jectives cannot be met completely, and *
all major training objectives to which this course contributes
significantly can be met by alternate means, but minor training
objectives will not be accomplished.
4. Type of training. In order of decreasing priority, the possible
types of training are:
training conducted on board the duty station or operational site
in functions which contribute directly to combat readiness, opera-
tional capability, or technical maintenance,
training of teams of personnel to perform functions within units
of the operating forces,
training which qualifies for assignment'of an existing or planned
NEC or NOBC in units of the operating forces, or training, which
awards certification of a skill upon successful completion of the
course,
training which earns an NEC or NOBC of a billet ashore, or training
in operational or technical skills similar to NEC or NOBC awarding
courses, or is designated as a Class C or F course, or is designated
for achievement of journeyman level,
training in initial skills, or is designated as a Class A course,
or is designated for achievement of apprentice level, or training
for advancement in rating to pay-grade E-4,
advanced training of career-development nature or designed for
supervisory or managemerN skills, or training for advancement in
rating to pay-grades E-5 and above, and
all other types of training.
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5. Quantity of personnel to be trained. Categories of annual inputs
range from over 10,000 to less than 50 trainees per year.
In order to assign a priority designator to any project, one works
through a series of tables, reading off the categories appropriate for each
of the items summarized above to determine priority codes which are combinedin the fables to yield a priority designator, a number varying from 00 to
32, with lower numbers designating higher priority.
Once a project has been assigned the priority designator, it comes
before the Training Requirements Committee. This committee, which meets
at least monthly, examines each proposal and delivers' a recommendation for
CNET action. Members of the Training Requirements Committee are drawn from
each of the CNET Sections, from
administrative levels directly below the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Detailed descriptions of the .composition of the
committee and duties of committee members are found in CNET Staff Instruc-
tion 1500.5, 22 April 1974.
Y.
As shown in figure 6, the Training Requirements Committee normally
issues one of five possible recommendations for each project. In some cases
the recommendation is implemented directly, and in some cases it is referred
to a Priorities Board for further review. The Priorities Board, consisting
of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of CNET, has the final authority within CNET
on training decisions. Pdssible recommendations of the Training Require-
ments Committee, and the Action required by the Priorities Board, are as
follow (source: CNETSTAFFINST 1500.4):
1. The training requirement is considered valid and can be met-within
existing resources and training linitations. These actions are passed to
the appropriate operations division for implementation.
2. The training requirement is considered valid but implementation
should be postponed until the budget or subsequent year. In these 'cases a
budget' request is made, and when funding is made available the program is
implemented.
3. The training requirement is considered valid and the training pro-
gram needs to be implemented during the current fiscal year, but resources
or Congressional training authorization are not readily available. Such
recommendations are forwarded to the PriOrities Board, along with a summary
of specific deficiencies, recommended lower priority source of compensation,
and possible recommendation for consideration at a later date. The Priori
-.
ties Board then decides whether or not to implement the program and if im-
plementation is directed, what sources will be used for the funds. Generat-ing funds may require discontinuance of a lower priority project.
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4_ The training request is not considered valid and implementation
is not recommended.' In these instances the committee recommendation and
the reasons therefore are recorded and forwarded for decision by the Prior-
ities Board. If the Priorities Board concurs, the originator of.the require-
ment is notified.
5. The request cannot be processed since quantified data are lacking.
In these cases, the cognizant staff code is requested to.provide the missing
data, and the request form is recycled for consideration at a subsequent
meeting.
In summary, the process of deciding which programs to implement consists
of two major phases. The first phase, assigning a priority designator, is
a fairly mechanical means of measuring the overall usefulness of the program
to the Navy, while the second phase, consisting of reviews by the Training
Requirements Committee and the Priorities Board allows for input of 'scale of
the intangible considerations.
COMMENT ON EXISTING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM. The general problem of
developing training requirements, one must recognize, is ill defined. Most
organizations deal with such situations by avoiding meaningful long range
planning (instead, they react to crises as they arise) and by relying on
standard rules for making decisions. Both of these modes of action basically
ignore the existence and importance of uncertainty. The plan becomes a sub-
stitute for reality. The process described for developing training require-
ments is in agreement with this obseinvation. Ideally the role and composi-:
tibn of the NaVy over at least the near future would be translated into
lists of specific required skills, which would in turn be used, along with
skill inventory projections, to determine training requirements. This pro-
cess would intimately involve CNET as both the repository of training exper-
tise and the coordinating agency for all training. To some extent this pro-
cess is followed but only imperfectly. The operating Navy often is unsure
of its future requirements and of the impact-of broad level policy and force
changes upon training requirements; thus it is unable to give the training
command precise definitions of its needs (TAEG Report 12-1, Vol I, p. VI-340).
Instead of actively participating with the operating Navy in designing
training programs, the process described in the previous section has CNET
responding to requests for specific programs. As individual training re-
quests are submitted, it may be difficult to build an integrated and com-
plete training program, thus the.current system is rather piecemeal. The
CNET staff, order to at least partially overcome this problem, does do
some requirement definition, It must also be recognized that the above
description understates the amount of cooperative interaction between CNET
and the operating Navy by ignoring some of CNET's other functions, specifi-
cally in feedback and evaluation tasks and in training advisory roles.
Nevertheless, it must he remembered that the ideal is continued close coope-
ration between the training and outside commands in theSe matters.
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The essence of prWitization in any organization is the determination
of optimal trade offs among multiple objectives. The formal phase of the
current prioritization s heme recognizes trade offs to some extent.by making
the priority designator oepend on a number of factorsrthe purpose of the
training, the function o the personnel to be trained, the quantity of per-
sonnel to be trained, and so forth. A number of other factors, however,
such as the estimated resources needed to accomplish the.training, are
ignored in the formal prioritizatiOn scheme., These are brought informally
to the Training Requiremen s Committee and Priorities Board. In addition,
although the current schema has trade offs built into it, they are, in a
sense, hidden in the tables. The person who constructed the tables may have
had a good intuition for quantifying trade offs, but if these were more ex-
plicit it would be easier to correct the scheme for possible oversights and
to update the tables as the Navy's.role and needs change. The techniques
associated with multidimensional utility theory are ideally suited to this
task, and allow a much more explicit and logical, specification than is
possible strictly by use of iables. There are also a number of other bene-
fits which would result from a multidimensional utility approach to this
problem. Tt would identify t e measures of effectiveness for training and
separate these from process considerations, that is considerations of how
the means are to be obtained. To illustrate, measures of effectiveness
include costs, throughput, sk 11 level attained by the trainee, etc., while
process considerations includ some aspects of the type of training given,
location and setting of the t aining, training aids used, and so forth. The
current scheme contains some :lements of both purpose and process. Also,
there are some legitimate pur oses of training, such as cost reduction, and
h' -'hly relevant consideration- such as estimated resources needed for the
new program, which are not fol4ally addressed by the current scheme but
/
which could easily be include in a multidimensional utility formulation.
Finally, a new scheme could y eld a priority designator which could be
calibrated in terms of some measure, such as dollars. It would then be
easy to judge the impact of adding or dropping any given project. The pre-
cise manner in which multidiMensional utility theory could be used to con-
struct a new scheme is too technical to describe here, but the technique
is moderately straightforward.
The final steps of the/prioritization process, review and final priori-
tization by the Training Requirements Committee and Priorities Board, allows
for a broad based review and negotiation process by the managers involved.
Every successful manager h s learned that there are some facets of any problem
which are difficult to wor into a formal analytic structure but which are
critical to any decision. For example, factors involving morale or humani-
tarian issues are difficu t to quantify. In addition, the opinions and
desires of some people in an-organization carry more weight than those of
others. Thus, ;the best ormal prioritization scheme p6ssible would fail
unless there were some4i formal mechanism for working the intangible consi-
derations into the priority ranking. The two committees allow for such an
input, thus their exist nce and continued functioning are critical. It
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has been repeatedly demonstrated, however, that although the human mind,is
extremely good at some kinds of complex synthesis tasks, it is very bad at
systematically processing complex data. In particular, humans are poor at
consistently choosing optimal combinations of factors, especially when many
factors must be considered simultaneously. Sin' prioritization requires
this kind of thinking, it is advantageous to inc de as many factors as
possible in a formal prioritization scheme, and t I use managerial judge-
ment to adjust the results to allow for the factoia which were omitted.
To do this job well, the committees require a formal scheme which (1) con-
siders all quantifiable factors in deriving a priority ranking, and (2)
yields not only a priority ranking, but a measure -of the strength of the
priority differences as well, so the committees can determine the "cost"
of altering selected priorities. The multidimensional utility approach
discussed above does precisely that.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFYING THE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS SCHEME. Specific
recommendations for modifying the existing training requirements system are
as follows:
1. As far as pdssible, encourage-close and continual cooperation.
between CNET and the operating Navy (including the chief of naval material)
In defining long range training requirements. It would be useful to set
up a permanent committee to make such projections-on-a regular basis.
2. Develop a new formal prioritization scheme to allow the considera-
tion of all quantifiable factors including resource requirements, in deter-
mining priority scores. The technique of multidimensional utility theory
is ideally suited to developing this scheme.
3. -Slightly redefine the role of the Training Requirements Committee
and the Priorities Board so as to include quantifiable factors in the formal
prioritization' scheme, rather than in the factors considered explicitly by
the committees.
ANALYZE AND PLAN TRAINING
The "analyze and plan training" function determines the what, how,
where, when, and who of training, and yields an estimate of how much it
would cost. The first step is to determine the performance requirement to
be met, or the "what" of training. The performance requirement defines the
job to be done by the person receiving the training and identifies the quali-
fications required to do it. The differences between required qualifications
and available qualifications then determine the specific training goals and
tasks, which are further broken-down into specific elements to be taught.
These elements form the basis of the training course.
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The nAt step determines the "how" and "where" of training. Any given
course can, generally, be taught by any of a variety of techniques. The
most obvious method of presenting training is to start a new course, task
a shore school with providing the manpower and space to teach it, develop
an outline, provide equipment, then plan a regular schedule of presentations.
This can be a major undertaking with high costs, and sometimes considerable
savings can be realized by alternate methods, particularly when the proposed
training involves a relatively small number of people or when demand is
sporadic. Often an'existing course can be modified or extended so that the
new requirement could be attached to a related course. This may be particu-
larly attractive if courses were constructed in a "modular" fashion, with
modules constructed to cover single subject elements.. A training require-
ment can sometimes be contracted out to a manufacturer or conducted on board
a duty station, rather than ina school. Courses can be-taught in a number
of different locations, or students can all be brought to a central location.
Historically, training in the Navy has been dispersed among a number of loda-
dons. Currently there is an effort underway to centralize training as, much
as possible,. to restructure training classes to support a new.classification
of enlisted, personnel, and to reallocate specific training tasks among A
schools, B schools, and on-the-job training. Even when the decision has
been made on how and where to teach a course, decisions are still required
on what types of training equipment should be provided, what kinds of audio
and visual aids will be used, when programmed instruction texts are appro-
priate, etc.
. The final steps of the analysis and planning of training are to deter-
mine a training schedule (the "when" of training) and to specify the rates
or ratings to receive the training (the "who" of training). These factors,
once determined, finally yield an estimate of the resources required, in
terms of manpower, equipment, facilities, and money, and indicate when they
would be required.
DESCRIPTION OF AND COMMENT ON-THE EXISTING SYSTEM. Analysis and planning
decisions are made in a wide variety of locations within the NAVEDTRACOM,
by a wide variety of techniques. Broadly speaking, the "what" decisions
are based on task analyses, conducted partly by the Bureau of Naval Person-
nel (BUPERS) and partly by the training command. Task analyses are con-
cerned with describing skills required in existing ratings classifications,
rather than with analyzing the broader question of whether the ratings
classification itself is optimal.- (This latter issue has recently been
addressed in a larger study concerning a new Naval enlisted personnel
occupational classification scheme.) Once a task analysis is available,
the "what" of training is determined by noting the required skills identi-
fied in the analysis.
"How" and "where" questions are decided at a number of levels within
the NAVEDTRACOM, generally by informal means. There is currently work
underway to develop decision aids, in the form of computerized planning
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models, for detailed planning of school work loads and for student schedul-
ing, but by and large the personnel involved in these problems' rely on their
intuition and experience, on the opinions of professional educators'attached
to the staff, and the costing analyses developed as part of the individual
training proposals. Special studies are made on issues which involve sig-
nificant and semipermanent policy changes, such as the issues of central
versus decentralized training locations, and still other issues.form the
focus of long range research efforts, such as the question of the optimal
design of training aids. Some of the decisions discussed here are relatively-
well defined. In determining how many claSsrooms and instructors are needed
to instruct a given number of students in a well understood subject, for
example, there is a good consensus about what is needed. For overall plan-
ning and analysis purposes, then, one or many of the techniques discussed
for well defined problems may be helpful,.depending on the particular situa-
tion. Simulation models (e.g., TAEG Report 11-2 [Lindahl and Gardner, 1974])
should be extremely useful in scheduling student throughput and resource,re-
quirements for particular training courses. Optimization models of different
types could yield useful insights in facilities planning and scheduling_de-
cisions. In some of the other problems discussed above, however, a real dif-
ficulty is that the issues'are'pogsly defined and understood. In the choice
of training equipment, for example, there is general agreement that the train-
ing.equipment should simulate the actual field-situation as closely as pos-
sible, but the real question is "how close is close enough?" Is it'worth
$10,000, for example, to add a sixth degree of freedom to a flight simulator?
These are issues in which there is a good deal of disagreement and in which
experimental data are hard to come by and difficult to interpret. Decision.
analysis allows one to determine just which sources of uncertainty are the
most critical for any problem, and thus to indicate what studies or research
efforts are most likely to yield useful results.
"Who" and "when" decisions are not, in general, made within the.NAVED-
TRACOM. Entrance requirements for the schools are set largely by BUPERS,
but valid predictive work on student performance would be useful to the
NAVEDTRACOM in planning, in monitoring staff performance, and in assessing
the effectiveness of training methodologies. Such knowledge could also be
useful in recommending entrance criteria to those.groups which do make ad-
mittance decisions. The current separation of admitting and scheduling'
responsibilities from the training responsibility seems to conflict both
with the general management principle of consolidating authority and respon-
sibility, and with a good deal of civilian educational practices. In train-
-
ing contexts, however, particularly in the military, this separation may
perform a useful function. Training in the Navy is regarded as a service to
the fleet rather than an end in itself, and the fleet must have a great deal
of control if it is to be well serviced. That does not mean, though, that
the impact of training decisions upon the training command cannot be communi-
cated. Indeed, in order to make intelligent "who" and "when" decisions
'such impact information is vital. Thus the planning information developed
by the NAVEDTRACOM should be readily available to outside forces. As in the
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case of the "how" and "where" decisions, formal predictive models of both
the decision analytic type and the conventional operations research type
can be extremely helpful, and their use should be investigated. There is
currently little evidence of use of these techniques.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFYING THE ANALYSIS AND PLANNING SYSTEM. Specific
recommendations to improve decision making in analyzing and planning train-
ing are:
1. Implement computerized simulation models in planning and forecast-
, ing resource requirements for training operations
2. Disseminate knowledge of decision analytic techniques to those
working with ill defined,planning problems, and analyze specific planning
problems with these techniques to illustrate the applicability of the
method
3. Investigate the possibility of using simulation techniques to
project student performance as a function of student characteristics and
the type of training being performed, and
4. Disseminate, as widely as possible, information concerning the
impact of student characteristics on the training process to those who make
raining admission decisjons.
DINATE AND CONTROL TRAINING
As is the case with any large organization, the NAVEDTRACOM consists
of a rimber of organizational entities whose individual efforts must be
monitor-SO and .coordinated, The coordination and control prerogatives of
management are exercised to some.extent by all headquarters and staff
groups, th ugh the depth and span of control-differ greatly, of course, from
level to le el. Some members of the NAVEDTRACOM have been assigned, as their
major respon ibilities, a coordination and control function. The largest
single group doing this work is the staff of Training Program Coordinators
in CNTECHTRA. \More commonly, however, the coordination and control function
is exercised as \part of general' management responsibilities.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM. At the CNET level is a staff who are, in
effect, the duty ofIcers in charge of the actual training effort. All
training actually im lemented by the NAVEDTRACOM is funnelled through CNET
for endorsement, budgeting and funding, and'operational review and control
at the headquarters lev 1. Most of the problems faced by this staff are
day-to-day issues; a lot of "firefighting" goes on, with little time for
detailed analysis of tho issues. A good many of the decisions which have
to be made don't require.d4ailed analyses since the proper course of action
is fairly obvious. In caseS,where this is not so, the staff generally finds
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with the aid of the staff's collective judgement and experience, but rarely
with the aid of formal analytic techniques. The long range issues that do
exist relate to design of reporting and control systems for the groups which'
actually do the training, and determining methods of implementing certain
directives relating to priority setting and training methods. For example,
the CNO has directed that a substantial part of the training load now being
performed in shore-based schools be moved to the shipboard environment. A
number of problems in implementing this directive are foreseen by the opera-
tional fleet, who feel that:they have neither the time nor the resources to
effectively increase their current training load. The CNET staff is concerned
with determining which portions of the training can be effectively moved to
the ships and how to make the training work in that environment.
At the CNTECHTRA level is a group tasked with planning for and allocat-
ing resources to the training locations. This staff works out contingency
plans, such as what would be done by CNTECHTRA in case of mobilization, and
operational plans, such as how training should be relocated in the event of
a facilities shutdown, for approval by CNET. This branch is also heavily
involved in planning interservice training and in determining how portions
of the training process could be moved to the shipboard environment. The
staff also has responsibility for resource allocation, including the allo-
cation of instructor and support billets in CNTECHTRA, and providing physical
facilities to support training. The branch utilizes various rules of thumb
on student/teacher ratios, etc., in making these. allocations.
Other groups in CNTECHTRA have responsibilities for the direct super-
vision of training activities. These staffs decide how a course will be
run, what type of instruction will be used, what faCilities will be used,
what the pace of the instruction will be, and so forth.. The CNTECHTRA
groups rely heavily on advice and directives from CNET, CNETS, and the
CNTECHTRA.research groups, but there remains sufficient latitude to signi-
ficantly affect the efficiency of the training process.
Most of the detailed design of a course is done by a Training Program
Coordinator (TPC), an officer or chief petty officer with expertise either
in the subject area of the training or in the training process itself. The
CNTECHTRA staffs are responsible for training the.TPC in his job and super-
vising his efforts, but he usually has a good deal of latitude in determining
the details of the course. His suggested curriculum, course length, etc.,
are subject to review and correction by CNTECHTRA. or CNET.
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Managers rely heavily on historical methods
and rules of thumb, so examination and rationalization of those rules would
be desirable. In determining optimal resource allocations, training schedules,
or type of instruction, to take some specific examples, research efforts are
worthwhile if results can be communicated to operating managers in a useful
way. Such communication can take place in at least three ways:
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through training and seminar programs and written material, where
results can be summarized and the effects upon training decisions
discussed
.
throUgh directives, where results are not discussed but the impli-
cations are encoded in formal procedures and control mechanisms,
and
through decision aids, from simple decision rules (e.g., optimal
instructor to student ratios) to computerized decision models,
where the manager specifies'some parameters of-his problem and the
computer determines the optimal action.
Which combination of'means is chosen depends strongly upon the nature of
the particular problems being addressed.
IMPLEMENT TRAINING
This function includes all efforts directly involved with the actual
conduct of training. A number of activities are involved 'in the running
of the classroom, such as the preparation and distribution of instructional
materials, the conduct of class
'sessions, and the evaluation of students;
these are all included in the training implementation function. This func-
tion also includes such preliminary activities as the preparation of the
detailed course outline and presentation sequence, determination of specific
behavioral and knowledge objectives, and training the administrative dnd,
instructional personnel, and such post-training activities as training eval-
uation and evaluation of testing methods. These activities tie in closely
with the course-requirements as developed in the "analyze and plan training"
function discussed above. Finally the "implement training" function includes
some data management and administrative efforts, such as student enrollment,
student record maintenance, staff administration, etc.
The types of decisions made in this area are detailed, nonquantifiable,
and generally of too small a.scope to warrant must individual analysis. In
running a classroom it is not possible to explicitly analyze the effect of
each possible way of teaching a class. There is, or course, a difference
between good and bad instruction, but good instruction results not entirely
from good'administrative decisions but from good teaching techniques as well.
A number of broader, analyzable issues are, however, raised in the implemen-
tation function. Such issues as good general approaches to course material,
optimal class sizes, and reasonable ifielhods of training evaluation become
relevant only in a classroom situation.
EVALUATE PERFORMANCE
This function deals with the determination of how well training prepares
the individA' to perform his job assignment. Thus, it is a post-training
50r-
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feedback related to the relevancy of the training itself; ,as opposed to the
inzra-training feedback conducted wider the "implement training" function, '
which is designed to indicate how ell individual students are doing in the
course: Post-training feedback is ritical to the overall effectiveness of
the training effort, since the absen e of effective feedback from the func-
tional Navy could result in training which is inefficient, ineffective, or
irrelevant. .There is no widely accepted "best" way of evaluating training,
however, as all evaluation techniques are highly subject to bias and incom-
.plete, superficial, and irrelevant dat. Overcoming these problems com-
pletely is impossible, and even lessening'them to a significant-degree is
costly and time consuming. Due to the importance of the problem, there is
nevertheless a continuing effort to refi'e the techniques and to gather
feedback information.
DESCRIPTION OF AND COMMENT ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM. Feedback information is
broken into two major types, summative feedback, Which genOrally indicates
that a problem exists bUt which gives little information .pn how the prOblem .
could be corrected, and formatiVe feedback, which yields linformation on the
particular problem and indicates how the problem could be §olved. Examples
of summative feedback are'unsolicited letters, material inspections, fleet
exercise reports, operational and technical evaluStion reports, some 3-M
reports, 'etc.-- These documents can indicate problems in the operation and
maintenance of equipment which can sometimes be traced back to inadequacies
in the training courses. Formative feedback, which is designed around the
evaluation of a specific'course, involves a determination of the objectives
of a co4rse then an assessment of whether or not,these objectives are being
met: ITo be effective a course must cover the objective material, the train-
ing must be done in such a way that behaviOr in field situations will be
positively affected (i.e., there must be a transfer of the training), and
the exam criteria used in the course must be relevant to field situations.
The technique usually used to obtain this feedback is to ask the man and his'
supervisor for comments after he is back on the Job.- This can be done via
a questionnaire. or during visits to the duty station by a NAVEOTRACOM staff
member. Evaluation methods of possible use to the NAVEDTRACOM, other than
those mentioned above, are interviews with rotating fleet and training per-
sonnel, experimental Methods, use of Perforinance diaries, and formal, struc-
tured Visits to duty stations. Each of these methods, along with their
advantages and disadvantages, are 'mentioned briefly below. A fuller dis-
cussion can be found in TAEG Report 12-1, Vol 1, pp. V,4-190 and 191.
In evaluating the results of any feedback method it must be remembered
that the fleet often does not understand the purpose of a given training
course; thus is prone to giving erroneous feedback, and that the NAVEDTRACOM
has little control over the qualifications of incoming trainees. The seeming
inadequacy of a training course may not be due to the course desgn.or im-
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from a theoretical point of view the evaluation picture is not tidy.
Efforts are fragmented and tend to be superficial. Before discussing ways
of improving this, however, it is worth considering how much effort the
evaluation function is worth. Evaluation can be extremely demanding of
money, time, and personnel. Specialized skills, which are generally scarce,
are required.. Clearly some reasonable level of evaluation effort must be
determined, and that level may well be.less than the theoretical "best that
money can buy." In addition, one must recognize that training does not occur
in a, vacuum. Training goals and course objectives are set in response .to
requests from and in conjunction with the operating Navy. The NAVEDTRACOM
staff is generally familiar with Naval needs and procedures; trainees do go
out to duty stations and occasionally word on performance does get back to
the.training command, all without too much effort on the part of the NAVED-
TRACOM. Biased, sporadic., and distorted as these informal means are, they
sum to a fairly large amount of useful information;f104. The next level of
effort, which involves such active but relatively simplistic information
search techniques as mail out questionnaires, infotmal visits. to duty sta-
tions, and screening of existing data banks, is also in wide use in the
NAVEDTRACOM. Again the total amount of informatiOn gained throUgh such
means is consequential. Such techniques would be grossly inadequate for a
research oriented institution, but for an organization providing more -or-
less standard kinds of training in more-or-less standard ways they may
suffice. This is not to say that present methods could not be improved.
Present questionnaire design leaves much to be desired, and the timing of
the questionnaire mailings may not be optimal. The limitations of informal
feedback tend tote ignored. There are a number of cases where cooperation
and information exchange among different schools would be useful, but th re
is no integrated effort to obtain feedback. (See TAEG Report 12-1, Vol 1,
pp. VI-224 and225 for a discussion of these points.) Finally, there appears
to be a legitimate, though limited role for the more sophisticated techni-
ques of evaluation, namely use of professionally designed and evaluated
experiments, use of pertbrmance diaries. and-other structured performance
records,. and use of structured interviews. A capacity in this area would
enable in-depth analysis of new teaching methods, evaluations of problem.
courses, and be a good source of knowledge for the educational process in
general.
\ Once a system for gathering, feedback information in an effective manner
is established, one must be concerned with how. to determine measures of
training effectiVeness. This again is an extremely difficult research area
as there is little agreement on -what, specifically, constitutes effective
training. It is pOssible to gather experimental data on, say, how often
given tasks can be performed successfully, how quickly students can respond
to simWated emergency conditions, how well students have mastered factual
data, etc. Further, such data can be gathered and compared for different
training methods, enabling one to obtain some relatively objective effective-
ness comparisons among the methods. With proper experimental design, the
effects of inherent differendes among students could also be negated. Un-
resolved problems, though, exist:in the following areas:
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1. The above approach yields many measures of effectiveness in different
tasks, while a single overall measure is desired,
.2. The individual data items gathered must relate directly to effec-
tiveness in operations, and there are difficulties in establishing this
relationship,
3. Experimental data are often difficult to gather and subjective in
nature (what, for example, constitutes successful performance of a task?),
and
4. 'Experimentation is expensive, and it is not clear that experimental
establishment of measures of effectiveness is always an effective use of funds.
Although these problems must, to a large extent, be dealt with through infor-
mal techniques (experimental ingenuity, understanding of job requirements,
experience), formal techniques could be very useful, particularly in combin-
ing 'multiple measures into a single measure of effectiveness, in clarifying
assumptions, and in evaluating the potential worth of experimentation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGING THE PRESENT SYSTEM. What is needed is first, an
improved method of collecting data and, second, better ways of determining
total measures of effectiveness. Consider first an improved' data collection
system. Such a system should involve a series of effort levelS; first the
"no effort" methods can generate rough ihformation on many areas; second; the'.
"Moderate effort" methods can be used to generate data on specific courses
and identify problem areas; and third, "high effort" methods can be used to
study problem areas in depth and perform research in the learning process.
A number,of specific suggestions are included. in TAEG Report 12-1, pages
VI-224 to VI-235. The "measures of effectiveness", problem is basically a
problem.inVolving:multiple measures of effectiveness under unCertainty. As
discussed in section II.B, page°17, multidimensional utility theory can some-
'times be used to determine a single measure of effectiveness and expectecrutility
used as a decision criterion under.uncertainty. This approach also indicates
'promiSing areas for further research. It is recommended that those persons in-
volved in research in these problems be familiarized With these techniques.
MANAGE RESOURCES
This function encompasses the management techniques which are associated
with resource control in any organization. Some of these are: (1) forecast-
ing expenses and constructing and defending budgets; (2) monitoring expen-
ditures of resources vs budgeted amounts, thencorrecting and updating bud-
gets, and implementing corrective action*to control budget variances;
(3) material management, including providing, maintaining, 'supporting, and
controlling material and equipment, quality control; maintenance and logistic
support; and.(4) the allocation, utilization, and record keeping of personnel
within the training command. In the NAVEDTRACOM these actions take place
within the context of the standard government planning and budgeting cycles,
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which enable the CNET,budgeting systeM to interface with Navy, DOD, and
Congressional budgeting data. Procedures for these efforts are spelled out
and documented in some detail in standard government directives. Some para-
meters,of the organizational design are also fixed by outside authority,.
and CNET must-operate within those limits.
D SCRIPTION OF AND COMMENT ON THE EXISTING SYSTEM. Some of the decisions
c tegorized under resource management are highly routine. Some of these,
such as determining inventory polities for spare parts, are highly amenable
to formal analysis; industrial
experience has-shown that careful analyticaldesign of inventory systems, to remain with this particular case, can be
most rewarding. A number of other routine functions, such.as record main-
tenance, are primarily administrative
rather than decision oriented in
nature.
,Other decf5ions may seem routine, but are critical to the success of
the training effort. Allocation of people within the staff, for example,
is an important deterMinate of effectiveness, efficiency, and morale. Selec-
tion of.a material' control system can be critical in the.success of an effort.
The NAVEDTRACOM staffs rely heavily on experience and other informal mecha-
nisms for making these decisions. There are also groups tasked with provid-
g budgeting and financial expertise, acting primarily in advisory roles
to the rest of-the command, projecting the resource needs of various pro-
posals, outlining funding alternatives and interpreting budgetary constraints
for the other groups. These staffs are generOly represented in decision
making groups, but in the role of defining. feasible alternatives and per-
forming economic. analyses of decision alternatives, rather than in the role
of advocating particular projects. Such practices are in'agreement with
usual management techniques, and cannot, in general, be faulted. Detailed
investigation of specific decision pradtices in this area was not9under-
taken in this research..
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE CURRENT SYSTEM. In those areas of resource
management which involve well defined, routine functions, such as inventory
management, production tontrol, quality control, forecasting demand, and
other areas, use should be made of the wide variety of analytic techniques
commonly used in modern managemeht. Industrial practice has demonstrated
that substantial operating improvements can result from proper application
of such analysis.
PERFORM RESEARCH
The "perform research" function includes all activities concerned with
the acquisition of knowledge relating to the training, learning, and evalu-
ative processes. As used here, then, the term
"research" includes not only
research in the sense of conducting formalized experimental situations, but
field studies and surveys, statistical analyses, 'and monitoring ongoing
research in other loCations as well.
"Research" can mean either basic or
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applied studies. The NAVEDTRACOM conducts some research in-house, sponsors .
some research performedby outside contractors, and reviews a good deal of
work performed by the research community at large.
DESCRIPTION OF AND COMMENT ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM. Research groups within
the training command have the responsibility of identifying current and
future needs of CNET, then insuring that research needed to satisfy those
needs is performed. This involves: first,.monitoring all relevant research
and development efforts, both within and outside the Navy, and identifying
r sults of interest to CNET; second, coordinating efforts among research
g oups whenever appropriate; third, determining priorities among potential
research efforts which CNET could encourage or sponsor; and fourth, designing
nd conducting or sponsoring specific research projects. The first two
/efforts are administrative rather than decision oriented. Some groups are
tasked with the role of being a research broker. Researchers and possible
funding sources are brought together. In return the NAVEDTRACOM asks for
support for its own research goals. The third effort involves the need for
a powerful decision making capacity, and being a prioritization function,
it shares many of the needs"of prioritization schemes as discussed in section
III.B. The research prioritization function differs from the training prio-
, ritization function in that uncertainties are even greater and objectives
\\ less\well defined in the research prioritization. Finally, a good deal of
\research is done in-house by the training command. Some of this is very
SjJeqific, such as research into the teaching process. Task analyses are
perforMed for given jobs, alternate methods of teaching tasks are considered,
human factors analyses are performed to determine the most promising teach-
ing methods, and programs are evaluated. For example, such research at the
CNTECHTM level is oriented toward very specific criteria, such as lowering
student attrition rate, optimizing use of instructor time, or minimizing
costs. Other efforts are directed towards more general problems, such as
methods of determining optimal equipment designs, ways of measuring.the
transfer of-training, and so forth.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. CouNents on optimal experimental design
are not made as that is tooilarge a subject to address here. The subject
of choosing which data are most worth experimental pursuit is, however,
essentially a prioritization problem. The techniques discussed earlier
should be just as beneficial in this setting as in projeCt prioritilation,
thus it is recommended that managers charged with prioritizing research
projects investigate the possibility of developing, through decision analytic
techniques, a formal ranking scheme to account for quantifiable factors.
Nonquantifiable factors could be handled through prioritization committees
and individual judgement, as is being done now.
SUPPORT TRAINING.
This function includes all activities directly relating to the support
of training operations. Among the specific items accomplished are:
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1. Development, procurement, and maintenance of training equipment,
ranging in scope from small inexpensive items to room-sized simulators,
2. Development and dissemination of self-instruction materials and
training packages for use in on board training,
3. Procurement and dissemination of books for libraries,
4.-
,Development, administration, and scoring of tests for advancements
in rating, and
5.. Recommending course structures and training media.
DESCRIPTION OF AND COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM. The first area of respon-
sibility of the support staff concerns equipment design and selection.
There are two types of 'decision tasks falling in this area. First, in de-
signing new equipment,, trade offs must be made among cost, schedule, and
various performance parameters. The second, related task involves both
monitoring and evaluating new developments, both technical and educational,
and determining when'to "freeze" equipment design. Sometimes these tasks
are identical,'such as in determining the design for a new one-of-a-kind;
high cost simulator. In other cases these are distinct types of decisions.
In providing operating units with such standard equipment as projectors and
tape recorders, for example, CNETS must continually balance the benefits
of standardizing on newer, improved equipment versus the extra costs of
obsoleting present inventories and spares and restocking a logistics system
for the new unit. Decisions in this field are difficult to make, but, both
these types of issues can be approached more systematically through decision
analySis than is done traditionally.
To illustrate the,general approach to analyzingthese problems, consider
an example in equipment design. This example is grossly over simplified,
but it should serve to outline the technique.
Suppose a large one-of-a-kind simulator is being designed, and it is
unclear whether or not a particular feature, costing $D, is worth including.
The key issues, clearly are (1) how much better, or. faster, or cheaper,
Will training'be with the feature, and (2) how much, in dollar terms, is
it worth to have better, faster, or cheaper training. Let us first discuss
the dollars issue. Sometimes,, as is the case when the feature leads to
cheaper training, any theoretical difficulties go away. A severe practical
problem may exist in estimating the,magnitude and duration' of the savings,
but one could easily use a simulation model to determine how much time and
effOrt is warranted in collecting that data; Likewise, if the feature leads
to faster training it should. be possible to simplify the problem by estimat-
ing the cost per day of training, then translating the time savings to a
cost savings and analyzing as above. If the feature leads to an improvement
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in training (i.e., an increase in skill level), it would be necessary to
quantify skill level in terms of one or more measures, then determine trade
offs among cost and skill levels. This can be done through multidimensional
utility theory.
A more difficult datum to establish is the degree-to which training
will be improved by the feature. Not only is the training mechanism poorly
understood, but results should vary from student to student. One can,
however, use decision analysis to quantify the degree of thiS uncertainty.
People expert in the field could be.asked to assess probability distributions
over the range of possible improvements, then this data can be used to deter-
mine whether a decision can be made immediately or whether experimental
evidence of various kinds should be gathered. Even in highly uncertain
areas it is usually remarkable how closely experts will agree on the limits /
of their uncertainty.
The.second area of responSibility in training support includes writing
and updating training manuals and texts. In writing manuals the selection/
and structuring of materials is clearly of major importance, and careful
coordination between the support staff and outside groups is necessary to
insure ah effective product.
The third area of responsibility, supporting general libraries afloat
and ashore, is n)t so much an issue in itself, but does raise once more the
problem of project prioritization since library support functions must cOm-:
pete with other areas for funding, and it is difficult to quantify the bene-
fits of supporting libraries. As is generally the case within the training
command, there are more projects coming to the support groups than ca!'i be
handled, so some method of prioritization is needed. It was found 'Oat
support groups rely exclusively on informal schemes, such as-the priOrities
board. A number of precedents exist to guide funding decisions on. various
types of.efforts; these are supplemented by staff studies on project' validity,
benefits, and costs, and the collective experience of the board. Also, data
from the field is generally collected on the projected impact of funding
alterations. In determining the effect of investing a given amount of money
into simulators versus libraries, for example, both internal and external
opinions are solicited on the probable effects on the quality of the train-
ing effort, but no attempt is made to formally measure or trade off those
effects. Tf all relevant issues in these decisions are indeed nonquanti-
fiable, this may be the only possible way to proceed. .Almost always, however,
it is possible to systematize at least part of this process and to improve
the quality of decision making.
The fourth area of responsibility, relating to testing training course
gradw.i.tes, is a significant aspect of the support function, but is not a
significant decision activity. Thus, it is not discussed in this report..
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The final area of responsibility conce ns training structure and organi-
.zation. The support staff supports this e fort with task and course analysis,
and is responsible for making recommendat ons on optimal ways of restructur-
ing training.. A good deal of work is als .done on recommending training
media and equipment appropriate for give courses.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. It i. difficult to make blanket.recommenda-tionsin an area as diverse as this e. Formal decision techniques, in-
cluding decision analysis, seem to have potential usefulless, bUt it.seemsdifficult to set Upta, system to use such techniques on a routine basis.
Perhaps the best way of introducing support groups to the potential of for-
mal techniques is to train a relatively small group then let them act asinternal consultants. If such a counsUlting group were already established,
it would facilitate such a move.
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL CONTROL.
This function includes personnel administration; a number of human re-
sources, equal opportunity, and drug/alcohol programs; such management
services as management analysis, computer systems administration, and manage-
ment information systems design and administration; and a number of routine
accounting and budgetary functions. Decision making in these areas was not
analyzed in this report.
MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS
The training command performs a variety of miscellaneous missions.
Some of these areas, a few of which are quite sizable, are educational pro-
grams, equipment design, and budget advice. The educational programs areaincludes administration of, curricula development for, and selection ofstu-dents for the Navy Campus for Achievement, the NROTC and Junior NROTC pro-
grams,.the Naval.Postgraduate School, the Naval- Academy, special or gra uate
education in universities, officer enlistment programs, those overseasdependent schools for which the Navy has been assigned responsibility, ndinternal management training. The equipment design area arises from the
recognition that the initial design of a piece of equipment clearly has abearing on the amount and type of training later required to qualify per-
sonnel to operate and maintain it. The training command tries to establish
an effective dialogue with the equipment design office as early as possible
so that training considerations
can be anticipated.. In this relationship
CNET does not act as a decision maker, but as an advisor. The budget
advisory role relates to the governmental budgeting and accounting cycle
as it affects training. Thetraining'command works with the operating Navyin projecting training.needs and including required resources in trainingbudget requests. In addition, cooperation and advice is given in arrangingfunding for items submitted too late to include in budget estimates.
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C. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DECISION MAKING IN THE NAVEDTRACOM
Decision making within the NAVEDTRACOM relies'heavily upon informal
judgements, group consensus, rules of thumb, and traditional practice.
This is a common mode of decision making in large Organizations and is
rather to be expected. In the NAVEDTRACOM, in fact, pressures toward such
behavior appear to be even greater than in corporations.
THE NAVEDTRACOM DECISION ENVIRONMENT
Decision problems which are easiest to solve through analysis are those
which are well defined, where uncertainty is negligible, and where a single
decisiOn criterion (measure of effectiveness) exists.\ Most problems in the
business world are not this tidy, and in the NAVEDTRACOM the vast majority
of decisions are even more'complex than in business. \Mile a business can
usually use financial gain criteria at least as the starting point of an
analysis, in the training command this common measure is lacking. The "cost"
side of training is.readily apparent, but the "benefit \side is nearly un-
meaSurable.. One cannot easily put a' dollar value on the benefits of training,
so the best one can hope to do is to determine the ninithum cost of meeting
preset training criteria. When it comes to deciding what those criteria
should be, however, a subjective evaluation must be made, In addition, one
must recognize that the NAVEDTRACOM decision maker is not only a part of the
training command, but a member of the:Navy. The tightness of the Naval
community, the importance of personal influence and contacts, the permanence
and importance of the fitness reporting system, and the ever present concern
with one's career all combine to give "political" considerations extraordi-
nary importance. One always considers not only how good or bad a program
.looks on paper, but who is pushing it and how much. weight he carries. Such
pressures exist, of course, in every large organization, biit in'the military
they seem to be particularly evident. This tends to confuse the effective-
ness measurement picture even more, as a whole list of new factors are
brought into.every'decision.
Another critical factor in the decision environment is the fact that
the military manager is a highly transient individual. The frequent rata-
tion cycle encourages a certain shortsightedness in Naval management methods,
one consequence of which is that outof-the-ordinary things, especially if
they are complicated, do not get done. In industry a good many analytic
efforts start with the "conversion" of a manager, who then uses the method
in his own department, on his own problems. He builds up an expertise and
a staff familiar with the method and produces, eventually, some concrete
benefits. In the Navy it is difficult to do this, as both the\manager and
the staff are continually shifted. There is little incentive to try some-
thing new, no matter how promising, unless the payback is immediate.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE NAVEDTRACOM
Given the limits of this environment there still appear to be promising
areas for improving the decisions made by the NAVEDTRACOM. Further, the
magnitude, importance, and complexity of the problems being faced make better
decision making techniques imperative. In this research a number of oppor-
tunities for improving decision making have been identified and discussed.
Suggestions can be classified as being improvedents in organiation, in data
gathering procedures, in decision rules, in analytic capability, and in
analytic techniqueti,
\
Organizational improvements refer both to formal organizational changes
and to changes in formal communication mechanisms. If separate groups each
possess only portions of the information necessary to make rational deci-
sions, then cooperation and information exchange among the groups will often
improve the quality of decisions made. This does not happen automatically,
since prop r reward structures and task definitions must also exist, but
Complete discussion of these issues would go beyond the limits of this report.
Specific of* izational improvements that can be suggested are:
0 role of prioritization committees and other management groups
in project prioritization be modified to emphasize only the non-
quantitative factors, with quantifiable factors being included
in a formalized scheme,
in developing training requirements, the NAVEDTRACOM and the
operating forces should set up a joint, continuing effort to de-
fine and project requirements,
CNET should disseminate projections of training costs and success
rates as a function of student character'stics, and
in training support, continuous communication between the staffs
involved in writing training manuals and texts and the schools is
essential.
The professional background of the researcher precluded an exhaustive exami-
nation of organizational issues;
undoubtedly, much more could be said in
these areas.
Data gathering procedures can be improved particularly in the training
evaluation function. A range of feedback techniques should be used to deter-
mine weaknesses in the current training system. In addition, techniques of
applying some of the methods currently used can be improved, as discussed in
TAEG Report 12-1, pp. VI-224 to VI-236.
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Decision rules are defined as the specific guidelines and procedures
by which organizations make decisions. Often these are very informal, being
expressed as general rules of thumb, or they can be formalized as standard
procedures. .Sometimes there is a good deal of wisdom built into these rules,
but sometimes they lead to non-optimal decisions. jhus,Asystematic,
rational redefinition of decision rule; may pay dividends, particularly
since it is usually possible for an operating manager to apply the rules
without understanding the details of the analysis behind the derivation
of them. Decision rules can be expressed in the form of simple "if-then"
statements ("If anticipated training load is greater than 100 students per
year then set up a new course"), in the form of tables and charts which are
used in scoring possible actions, or in the form of computer models. Some
areas where rationalization of decision rules seem particularly appropriate
are:
in the formal phases of project prioritization, whereby project
characteristics can be used to derive a priority ranking much as
is.now done in the training requirements area, but with the tables
being more systematically derived,
in the analysis and planning area, where computerized planning and
forecasting models can usefully capture a good part of the com-
plexity inherent in such situations, and
in the coordination and control area, where many day-to-day deci-
sions on training administration must be made on an ad hoc basis,
but where a' systematic examination of such issues as optimal
student/instructor ratios, optimal methods of presenting various
types of material, etc., could be beneficial.
Improvements in the analytic capability of an organization can be brought
about by increasing the level of analysis which underlies standard decision
rules, as discussed above, by using outside specialists in the analysis of
particular problems,by establishing groups of analytical specialists to be
used as internal consultants, and by increasing the general managers' under-
standing of and use of analytic techniques. Each of these approaches has
its particular strengths. Through improving the decision rules one can
parsimoniously improve the mass of decisions, but unusual or extremely im-
portant decisions cannot be handled with standard rules: Outside experts
can bring particularly needed expertise to bear and can be hired only as
long as needed, but they can be expensive; they must become educated in the
organization's problems and must be found and identified. Internal consul-
tant groups are invaluable for longer term expertise and are usually familiar.
with the organization, its problems, and often its personnel, but may lack
expertise in specialized areas. Increasing the analytical sophistication
of the general manager is difficult and expensive, particularly in highly
transient organizations, but some education is necessary before the manager
I
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even recognizes the possiblity of formal analysis. All-four approaches are
thus appropriate for different circumstances, and balanced program is
necessary to derive maximum benefits from formal analysis.
A few of th ecific areas in which an enhanced nalytic capability
would be useful are in the determination of the relatiOpship of student
characteristics to length, proficiency attained, and dre out rate in training;
in the planning of training, where.a number of recurring decision problems
regarding training structure occur; and in the resource m pagement function,
which is an area where formal techniques have returned subStantial benefitsin industrial settings.
,
.
The final suggestion involves improving analytic techni4es. As out
for dealing with decision problems. A fairly new and extremely
lined briefly in the taxonomy; a number of analytic approaches have been
powerful series of techniques, decision and utility analyses,- premise an
approach to solving problems which are intractable by any other means.
Analytic expertise in this field is valuable in determining measures of
effectiveness, in dealing-with problems involving uncertainty, in working
with ill defined problems, and in working with problems where resul s are
difficult to estimate or quantify.
A specific suggestion arising from the last two paragraphs is to estab-
lish an internal consultant group familiar with formal analysis, particularly
decision analysis. Some consultant type groups already exist in the NAV, D-
TRACOM. Since these groups already exist as operational entities and al
ready have a good deal of analytical expertise and experience, adding a d
cision analytic capability would not be too difficult. This could.be done\
in a variety of ways. The Naval Postgraduate School is able to offer educ&-
tional" programs, fromcbrief introductory courses to accredited,short courses
at field sites. If there is interest in doing this, a program tailored to
the NAVEDTRACOM's needs and desires can be arranged. Self-education is a
second possibility. The classic introductory text in decision analysis is
Decision Analysis by Howard Raiffa, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1968.
A newer text, perhaps more appropriate for the generalist, is Decision
Analysis for the Manager by Brown, Kahr, and Peterson, published by Holt,
Rhinehart and Winston, New York, 1974. The Naval Postgraduate School has
a capability in developing programmed learning
material, and could be tasked
with providing such a course in decision.analysis. A third possibility is
to educate CNET personnel in university courses in decision analysis. A
number of schools offer such courses. The two most well known being the
graduate schools of business administration of Harvard and Stanford Univer-
sities. A fourth possibility is an expert in decision analysis could be
hired directly to an internal consulting group. This is clearly the most
direct way of gaininc, expertise. A final suggestion is to hire iutside
consultants Tor selected analysis projects. This would not only anow mem-bers of the training command to see the techniques in practice, but to
appraise the usefulness of the approach. External consultants can 'also be
used directly in educational roles.
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SECTION IV
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, the major points and conclusions reached throughout
this report are summarized, some suggestions for implementing change given,
and recommendations for further research and development work made.,
A. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
In section II, the background of the research is presented. Organiza-.
tional decision making is discussed in section II..A, the major observation
being that organizations typically rely heavily on "irrational' techniques
for decision making, but that there are very. rational reasons for doing so.
Then in sections II.B and II.C, some background in formal, rational tech-
niques of decision making is given, with section II.B containing a taxonomy
of decision techniques and section II.0 an outline,of formal decision
theory. These two lines of thought are by,ght together in section II.D
where the actual and potential use of rational decision techniques in pri-
marily irrational decision environments 4i,Sdiscussed. It is pointed out
that decision analysis not only,shows,great promise on paper, but has
demonstrated significant benefits in actual situations. The attitude of
the manager and the competence of. the analyst, however, are critical to the
success of any analysis.
In section III, a broad overview of the.functions-performed by the,
NAVEDTRACOM is given, then the types of decisions made within the command
are discussed in some detail. Section III.0 summarizes observations of
NAVEDTRACOM decision making, pointing out the extraordinarily heavy
reliance on informal techniques for critical decisions and indicating some
reasons for this. A number of potential areas for improving decisions are
identified and the reasons for considering these areas are discussed.
B. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
There are two routes to be considered in improving decisions in an
organization--a "cookbook" approach -and an "educational/consulting" ap-
proach. In the "cookbook" approach the decision maker is given a set of
instructions which he more or,less blindly follows in order to reach his
decisions. This method has a number of advantages: a good deal of effort
and intelligence can go into designing the instructions, insuring a well
thought out and complete decision making procedure; the effects of person-
nel rotations on decision making are minimal; the instructions can be
gradually improved as experience is gained; the instructions
.can be ex-
pressed in many different forms, such as directives, standard operating
procedures, decision tables, computer models,-or informal recommendations;
and use of standard instructions leads to consistent, predictable decision
making. In some situations, such as in computerizednsystems," some simple
instructions may by necessity be built-in. Even in situations where
6'6
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computers are not involved, the "cookbook" approach has merit. The prioritySetting scheme used in the training analysis and planning area is an ex-ample of this situation Whenever a "cookbook" approach is appropriate,decision analysis can be used'to analyze the problems and construct thedecision rules. As long as the "book" is used, implementation of the resultsof the analysis is assured.
/
The "cookbook" approach is useful only in repetitive, predictable typesof problems where the major variables and considerations are,known in ad-vance. In other situations, individual analysis of the actual problems isrequired. This indicates that if analysis is used, either the manager him-self must be familiar with the analytical technique or a consultant (perhapsinternal to the NAVEDTRACOM) be used. Even in this latter case, some ex-posure of managers to the rudiments of analytical techniques is helpful.Some possible methods of introducing general management to this subject are:
1. Use of supporting relationships: This is exemplified by a consul-tant who uses analysis to solve a problem arising in the normal consultingrelationship,. During the presentation and discussion of the results, someeducational work takes place.
2. Short presentations: A short one- or two-hour management briefingwould suffice to outline some of the ideas and advantages of analyticaltechniques.
3. Articles and written summaries: a good deal of written materialsummarizing various analytical techniques exists, some of which is quitebasic. In the field of decision analysis, for example, the Harvard BusinessReview has printed a number of articles discussing
not only the theory butthe practice of decision analysis.
14
4. Textbooks: A number of books, including some programmed texts,go deeper into analytical techniq es than an article could do.
5. Seminar: Seminars, ranging in length from a half day to two orthree days could be useful in giving a fairly broad introduction to a groupof limited size.
6. Short course: The Naval Postgraduate School is currently offeringshort courses in a number of subject areas. If sufficient interest exists,a course could easily be offered in this format.
7. Other educational efforts: Many schools offer courses in analysiseither separately or as part of degree programs.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
There are a number of
areas in which further work in analysis, particu-larly in decision
analysis, appears promising.
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First, in working toward effective implementation, it is recommended
that a group (like TAEG) which is already involved ih analysis and con-
sulting within the NAVEDTRACOM be identified and given exp'erti'se in
decision' analytic techniques. The group is likely to be more receptive
to new techniques than general manageMent, and having already established
relationships within the command, be more effective as an ongoing educa-
tional agent than an outsider could be. Anyinternal group would also be
aware of outstanding problems, and be able to demonstrate concrete bene-
fits of decision analysis on those problems on which it consults. The
expertise could be most readily developed. through training seminars or
short courses, either of which the Naval Postgraduate School could offer.
A second recommendation, which could be accomplished in conjunction
with the first, is to identify and analyze a "cookbook" type project,
such as developing a prioritization rating scheme or formulating decision
rules of a computerized system.
;Implementation of.the results of such an analysis is less dependent
oh the manager than for less structured problems. Ideally, this would be
done by an internal consultant enrolled in the training program mentioned
above in conjunction with an outside expert.
The major area of potential improvement lies in educating the general
manager. As discUssed above, there are a number of methods of reaching
him. Such an effort should be undertaken in conjunction with establishing
expertise in an internal group, so the managers could obtain help on
problem's when necessary. General management education should be tied in
with concrete results on,a real problem in order to lend credibility to
the technique.'
Further research in decision making within NAVEDTRACOM should be
more narrow and more intensive in nature than was this vork. One parti-
cular organizational unit or function area should be selected and studied
in depth. Such a study should focus on the (1) types of problems faced,
(2) frequency of occurrence of each type, (3) decision methods used,'
(4) pressures and influences which limit decisiontalternatives, (5) impact
of the decisions made on the rest of the organization, and (0,formal and'
informal roles of the organizational unit in the total organization.
Alternatively a single type of problem (e.g., prioritization) could,,be
chosen for intensive study, with the same types of questions being asked.
The NAVEDTRACOM, like any large organization, is complex and unwieldy.
Its members are subject to human frailties and prejudices, and in the face\
of a complicated and uncertain world make mistakes in judgment. Decision \
analysis,and other formal techniques cannot overcome human frailty, but
they do allow one to examine his'thinking and assumptions in a way which
minimize's the faults attendant to being human.
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